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The 21st century we are now living in is called the “information age.” Information is 
becoming more and more important assets in nowadays economics. Sometimes it is called 
the oil of the 21st century. Businesses collect information about their users’ background, 
interests, search queries, buying habits and anything else they might find useful. They do it 
by means of collecting and analysing a vast amount of data. The technology and lower costs 
of data storage made it possible to collect immense amounts of information about the 
customers. There are businesses that have no other business plan than expanding their 
customer base and collecting data. Sometimes they do not even plan to be profitable and 
despite that they have huge market value.1 This shows how much value data have. 
Being overloaded by data these days, there is a need for the help of technology (hardware) 
and techniques (software) to enable businesses to gain some useful knowledge out of it. The 
method helping with that is called data mining. It is a process of looking for correlations 
among huge amount of data. When the gained knowledge is used to build profiles, we speak 
about profiling. Each profile includes suggestions for how to treat the subject that fits in 
respective profile, e.g. suggestions for customized advertising. The knowledge of the 
customers’ interests and desires is therefore a big competitive advantage. Businesses want 
to fine-tune their services to their clients’ needs so that they want to use them. Customers’ 
attention is a scarce commodity, which causes a big competition among businesses for 
getting the biggest part of it. Modern technology gives them the possibility to communicate 
personally with their customers for low costs so in case of succeeding in gaining the 
attention by targeting the customer with the right content, larger revenues can be expected 
on the side of the businesses. 
On the side of the customer there are certain profits as well. He sees more content that is 
relevant to him, which saves him time he would have to spend with searching. Or he might 
get a special discount on the product he likes to buy. In this case, he probably does not mind 
the fact that all of this is a result of processing vast amounts of data about him. However, if 
he is charged more for products he is in a dire need of, he might stop feeling so comfortable 
about that and might start doubting whether he wants to share all the data about him or be 
it used that way. And there are other less apparent problems that can raise doubts, e.g. 
                                                             
1 Grassegger, H.: Das Kapital bin ich, Zürich, Kein & Aber, 2014, p. 34, 37 
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regarding right for self-development or enjoying individual autonomy. Whereas the 
businesses want the customer to be transparent and provide as much data as possible, what 
they do with the data afterwards, which data is used for what purposes, where they are 
stored, how they are secured or who they further provide it to is often concealed. 
If the user does not want to be subject to those practices, he has only one possibility: not 
using the services collecting data at all, thus loosing possibility to take part in almost any 
online life. But mostly, users prefer to use their personal data as a currency and trade future 
privacy risks for a short-term convenient service. 
This thesis summarizes what data is used for creating profiles, how it is collected, what are 
the concerns regarding privacy, what is the actual legislation in the field of profiling 
(especially in data protection) in the European Union, what are its shortcomings and what 
is being proposed to ensure better privacy protection. Finding the right solution means 
finding the right balance between the interests of individuals and the society as a whole on 
privacy protection and the interests of private entities on conducting a profitable business 
and everyone’s interest on innovations and good functioning of the market avoiding or 
correcting market failures. Because the legislation has to take into account the impacts on 
economics, it is necessary to describe also todays’ business models. The main focus will be 
on the question how to put through the interest on taking part in the online world and using 
the online services without having the only possibility to pay for it with losing control over 
our data.  
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2. What is Profiling? 
 
Profiling is the process of creating profiles and the following application of them. There are 
many different profiling methods that are used for various purposes. What all those 
methods have in common is that they are a set of technologies using algorithms2 or other 
techniques to transform data into knowledge (creating profiles) and individuating a subject 
or identifying a subject as a member of a certain group so that the right profile is applied to 
them.3 Profiling methods help us to cope with the information overload, to gain useful 
knowledge out of it and to address a large number of customers individually. 
This work will focus on automated profiling, which is done by machines using the methods 
of data mining. Profiling includes five steps: data collection, data preparation, data mining, 
interpretation and determine actions.4 Further, the crucial steps (collection of data and data 
mining) are described in more detail. But first of all will be explained what profiles are. 
Profile 
The simplest category of profiles is an individual profile. It consists of the factual part, 
including information about who the customer is, and the behavioural part, including rules 
about the customers’ behaviour. The factual part is based on the collected factual data (age, 
gender etc.) that may be obtained directly from the consumer or derived from transactional 
data (buys cat food regularly → has a cat). The behavioural part is based only on 
transactional data consisting of records of the customer’s previous purchases or 
transactions.5 
                                                             
2 An algorithm is a set of orders that starts by taking an input (e.g. length and width of a rectangle) 
and ends after a finite number of steps by producing an output (e.g. the area of a rectangle; the steps 
would be: check if the input are two positive numbers and if not, let the user know that the input is 
wrong and end the computation, otherwise multiply the length by the width, return this value to the 
user and end the computation). 
3 Hildebrandt, M: ‘Defining Profiling: A New Type of Knowledge?’, in: Hildebrandt, M., Gutwirth, S. 
(eds.): Profiling the European Citizen, Springer, 2008, p. 17-18 
4 These steps were mentioned in the following book in relation to Knowledge Discovery in Databases 
(KDD) – a process of gaining useful knowledge out of a database, and they are applicable to profiling 
as well. Custers, B.: ‘Data Dilemmas in the Information Society: Introduction and Overview’, in: 
Custers, B. et al. (eds.): Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society, Berlin, Springer, 2013, 
p. 8 
5 Adomavicius, G. and Tuzhilin, A.: ‘Using Data Mining Methods to Build Customer Profiles’, Computer, 
2001, 34 (2), pp. 74-82, at p. 74 
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Group profiles contain behavioural rules for certain groups of individuals sharing at least 
one common attribute, e.g. left-handed people or students living in dormitories. Groups are 
identified especially by these two data mining methods: classification (used to map data into 
several predefined groups) and clustering (forming groups with similar properties)6. 
Within a group, either all of its members share the same attributes, e.g. a group of car driving 
license holders who are older than 15 (these groups are called distributive), or the profile 
does not apply to all of its members, e.g. people living in a certain area having average 
earnings of X; some earn X, some X+1 or X-1000 (these groups are called non-distributive). 
Most of the group profiles, except for the attribute they are defined by, are non-distributive. 
This distinction between group profiles is important for understanding the risks of profiling 
described in Chapter 3. 
Collection of Data 
Data is collected either directly from the user/customer or automatically by using technical 
means. 
Directly it is gained from the users of Internet services by asking them to provide 
information about themselves – name, address, e-mail address, date of birth, phone number, 
credit card number etc. either by a voluntary registration or by a ‘mandatory’ one, in order 
to be allowed to use the service. This means that if they want to use the service, they have 
no other choice than providing their data. 
But a lot more of other data may be collected while browsing the web without the user even 
being aware, e.g. what pages the user has visited, how much time he has spent there, from 
which site he has entered to the current site, what he does like etc. The collection methods 
are different, some of them are more accurate than others. The tools helping to gain more 
information about subjects are: requests including user’s IP address, cookies, web bugs, 
JavaScript (majority of websites use this technology used e.g. for animations or interactive 
content and browsers support it; if user disables JavaScript, he cannot usually see all the 
website’s content) or Flash (used sometimes on websites for displaying animations and 
videos). Now it is going to be explained how. 
                                                             
6 Calders, T. and Custers, B.: ‘What Is Data Mining and How Does It Work?’, in: Custers, B. et al. (eds.): 




IP addresses are unique identifiers of devices connected to the Internet enabling the 
communication between those devices. If a user wants to look at a website, his computer 
must send a request to the server hosting the website with a piece of information telling 
where to send the required content back to. Even though the IP address identifies a single 
device, monitoring from which IP address the request has come is not a very reliable method 
for identifying specific users in a long-term perspective, because firstly, the IP addresses can 
change on the side of the user often (when using mobile devices and changing locations or 
in case of dynamic IP addresses when the user is assigned a new IP address from a pool of 
addresses that their internet service provider has available each time they log on), and 
secondly, IP addresses specify rather the device than the concrete user. The device may be 
used by more family members or it may be a proxy server or a router serving many clients 
and sending the requested content further back to one of those clients. 
Cookies 
Cookies are small data files that are saved in user’s browser which are sent along with the 
loading request to the server hosting the website every time the user wants to load it again. 
So they give information about whether the user had already visited the website before, 
what his language settings or his activities were, e.g. what he had purchased or looked for 
before or if he had logged in. They can be used to facilitate the proper function of 
information society services, e.g. remembering the items added to the shopping cart on an 
online shopping website, or they may be used for the purposes of monitoring the users’ 
behaviour. The latter purpose have the third-party cookies, especially. If a web page 
includes links, images, HTML Iframe (presenting another HTML document within the same 
window) or similar components that are stored on some other servers than the respected 
web page and if the user hasn’t blocked acceptance of these third-party cookies, than these 
cookies will be saved in his browser as well. The providers of these cookies are companies 
like AOL Advertising, DoubleClick (subsidiary of Google) and so on, that penetrate a huge 
number of sites. If a user surfs on different websites that include content from these 
companies, the users’ browser always sends them the same cookie. That’s why they have 
information from more websites he has visited. This presumes that the cookies belong to 
the category of persistent cookies which are not deleted after leaving the website – in 
comparison to session cookies, that are deleted when the user leaves the website. 
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Because it is possible to block the acceptance of the third-party cookies (in the settings of 
the browser), new methods of tracking the user’s behaviour have been developed. 
Web Bugs 
A web bug is an object on a webpage, usually an invisible one pixel gif image, retrieved from 
a third-party server. In the moment of sending request for the webpage content, another 
request is sent also to that third-party server for this one pixel image. In that moment it is 
enabled to pass information to this third-party website about which device asked for it and 
when. 
The most famous web bug nowadays is the Facebook like button (designed as a hand giving 
“thumbs up”). Any content provider can include this button on his website if he wants to 
make use of its promotion functions – because any Facebook user clicking on it will share 
the link to it with its friends. Every time when loading a page that includes this button, the 
website sends a request to Facebook’s servers, handing him over information about what 
page it comes from, the visitor’s IP address and the Facebook ID if the user is logged in. And 
because it is sending this request along with a cookie, Facebook is able to create a database 
of all the websites visited from a certain device or even by a concrete person (without 
needing to even have a Facebook account). 
Clickstream 
Every time when a user is browsing the web, he leaves a trail of data – a so called log file 
giving information about their IP address, date, time, the webpage that provided the link to 
the website and so on. Aggregating this data, it is possible to create a clickstream giving 
information on what websites and what particular webpages on that website a user has 
visited, in which order and how much time the user has spent there, when he clicked the 
‘back’ button, what was the search query that got the user to the website etc. Clickstream 
gets stored on the servers hosting the website (monitoring the behaviour on its webpages), 
in the browser, on the routers of the internet service provider (ISP) or on the servers of 
advertising networks. 
Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting is a technique based usually on JavaScript and Flash. The information 
collected are the type and version of browser, operating system, installed plugins, screen 
size, installed fonts, language, time zone and even hardware configurations. Tracking firms 
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use sophisticated methods to find out these unique characteristics.7 Because of many 
different possibilities of settings, there is a high chance that the settings will be unique for 
each device.8 
Data Mining 
Data mining is a process of analysing a vast amount of data by algorithms looking for 
patterns and relations between the data. The relations can be trivial (revealing just facts 
that everyone knows), spurious (there is no actual causality), irrelevant (revealing 
correlations of no utility) or useful (revealing rules about customers’ behaviour). As an 
observer you do not have to know beforehand, what kind of relation you are looking for. 
You are not just verifying if your theory is right, you are actually discovering all possible 
relations you need not have thought of before. After that follows a step called validation, 
when a human validator looks at the results and decides which ones are useful. It means 
that by doing data mining you are actually generating hypotheses and only after an 
interpreter sees them and finds them interesting (novel, useful and nontrivial to compute) 
and certain enough (data are accurate and complete, the sample is big enough and the 
results are significant), they become knowledge.9 The correlations do not reveal any reasons 
for themselves. This would be the task of a further (human) interpretation, eventually. 
However, knowing the causes or reasons is not really of importance. Important is making 
good decisions about what to do next. For example in the case of ad networks: what ad to 
send to appear on the user’s site. 
 
The profiling technologies and techniques enable applying the profile as well. Making 
decisions about the business strategy towards consumers according to the knowledge 
gained by data mining is a very important step for businesses. Profiles are used either for 
cross-selling (trying to make a customer buy additional product or service on the base of 
the knowledge that a similar customer has made this decision) by means of making 
                                                             
7 More information on those methods can be found here: Nikiforakis, N. and Acar G.: ‘Browser 
Fingerprinting and the Online-Tracking Arms Race’, available at: 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/browser-fingerprinting-and-the-onlinetracking-
arms-race (31 December 2015) 
8 A study by Peter Eckersley has proven this fact. The study has shown that from a sample of around 
half a million distinct browsers, 84 % had unique configurations. Among browsers that had Flash or 
Java enabled, 94% were unique. https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf (26 
January 2016) 
9 Custers, B., ‘Data Dilemmas in the Information Society: Introduction and Overview‘, in Custers, B. et 
al. (eds.): Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society, Berlin, Springer, 2013, p. 10-12 
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recommendations (e.g. “other customers who bought this brand have also shopped for” or 
“frequently bought together”), one-on-one marketing (individualizing the virtual store or 
the offers for a concrete person) or banner targeting (tailoring the advertisements the user 
sees on the websites he browses on). What problems these practices may cause regarding 
privacy will be described in the following chapter.  
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3. Risks of Profiling in Relation to Privacy 
 
As a first step, profiling requires collecting a lot of data. The huge amount of data (on 
browsing behaviour or online transactions) that is being collected is not a problem itself. 
The problems may start with analysing and finding meaning in it10 that is intimate or 
sensitive for the respective subjects, something what they would like to keep private. 
Richard Posner does not agree that the process of data mining could invade privacy in any 
way because it is done by machines and privacy can be invaded only when human scrutiny 
occurs.11 He makes this observation regarding analysing information by intelligence 
agencies to find a couple of people who are a potential threat for national security. However, 
by the private entities the situation changes a little because decisions are being made upon 
the gained knowledge, affecting everyone – both the individuals whose data has already 
been analysed as well as the potential future clients. Decisions that are being made might 
be considered unethical or unwanted within society (like excluding some individuals or 
groups from certain services). 
Information provided by customers are provided with a certain intention or under certain 
circumstances. Many people do not object to the use of their personal data within that 
sphere or context they intended to share it in. However, if the data is used for completely 
other purposes, people do mind it and feel like their privacy has been breached. This is 
because the contextual norms of distribution and appropriateness (as Nissenbaum calls 
them) have been breached. Norms of distribution govern the flow of information, like who 
with and under what circumstances the information can be shared (e.g. it is expectable that 
my doctor shares some information about my health with his colleagues to discuss the right 
treatment for me but it is not expectable that he shares it with my boss). Norms of 
appropriateness govern what information is appropriate to reveal in a certain context (e.g. 
when with friends in a bar or at a job interview).12 These spheres may be breached e.g. by 
third-party cookies, clickstream data collected across websites, mergers of companies, 
selling of data etc. Nissenbaum comes with a theory of contextual integrity which is 
                                                             
10 Much of the raw data does not have to be personal at all and although lead to very “personal” 
revelations, e.g. regarding relationships, diseases or beliefs. 
11 Posner, R.: ‘Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis’, The Washington Post, December 21, 2005, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053.html (16 February 2015) 
12 Nissenbaum, H.: ‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity’, Washington Law Review, 2004, 79 (1), pp. 101-
139, at p. 120 
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maintained when both of the norms, of distribution and of appropriateness, are upheld. 
These privacy norms vary from place to place, culture to culture or period to period.13 
Contextual integrity is the definitive value protected by the right to privacy.14 
This is a new aspect in comparison to other earlier concepts of privacy that we will look at 
now. In general, it is hard to explicate what privacy is. The debates have started after 
publishing the famous article by Warren and Brandeis ‘The Right to Privacy’ and there is 
still no unity on that point until these days. To Warren and Brandeis it is primarily the “right 
to be let alone,” protecting individuals from invasions of other parties.15 It is interesting that 
their article was a reaction to the then development of tabloid media as nowadays we are 
facing the same question – what to cover under the term ‘right to privacy’ in the current 
information age to be able to protect it. Westin describes privacy as “the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”16 His approach is marked by the new 
possibilities for tapping of telecommunication systems.17 Agre defines privacy as “the 
freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction on one’s own identity.”18 
Similarly, Cohen says that privacy is “more generally about preventing the seamless 
imposition of patterns predetermined by others,”19 ensuring people the possibility to build 
their own identity without the pressure of what others think. In that sense privacy is 
understood as an ‘intermediate’ rather than a ‘final’ value.20 In my view, all these definitions 
are a reaction to a then present state of technological development. As Kühn points out, 
nowadays we are facing privacy interferences that are almost invisible, but frequent and 
ubiquitous, which is different from the earlier interferences like search warrants, 
                                                             
13 The problem is how to define the spheres as they may vary in time or according to culture and as 
they are influenced by technical innovations as well. Nissenbaum, H.: ‘Privacy as Contextual 
Integrity’, Washington Law Review, 2004, 79 (1), pp. 101-139, at p. 120, 138 
14 Dumortier, F.: ‘Facebook and Risks of “De-contextualization” of Information’, in: Gutwirth, S. et al. 
(eds.): Data Protection in a Profiled World, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 129 
15 Warren, S. and Brandeis, L.: ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 1890, 4, available at: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/37368/37368-h/37368-h.htm (20 February 2016) 
16 Westin, A. F.: Privacy and Freedom, New York, Atheneum, 1967, cited in: Solove, D. J. et al.: 
Information Privacy Law, New York, Aspen Publishers, 2006, p. 41 
17 Kleve, P. and De Mulder, R.: ‘Privacy Protection and the Right to Information: In Search of a New 
Symbiosis in the Information Age’, in: Mercado Kierkegaard, S. (ed.): Cyberlaw, Security & Privacy, 
International Association of IT Lawyers, 2007, p. 206 
18 Agre, P. E. and Rotenberg, M. (eds.), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1997, p. 7 
19 Cohen, J. E.: Configuring the Networked Self, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012, p. 150 
20 Rouvroy, A. and Poullet, Y.: ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy to Democracy’, in: Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds.): 
Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, 2009, p. 53 
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surveillance or communication tapping that are very clear and significant. The single 
interferences are not remarkable on its own but when combined together they can form a 
big privacy threat.21 Earlier, it used to be the state or mass media who had represented the 
threat to privacy. Now this power shifted to the online content providers and big 
technological enterprises. 
As we see, a lot has been written about the term privacy. Even though there is no precise 
definition of privacy, it cannot prevent us from having a discussion on how harmful the 
consequences of massive data collection and profiling can be. And neither from looking for 
the solutions to that. 
However, privacy is not the only value worth protecting. It opposes to other public goods 
such as innovation and efficiency.22 Businesses are not primarily interested in sniffing out 
information about one particular person. They are interested in coming with new ways how 
to gain attention of customers and their willingness to buy their goods or services. 
Innovations can lead to more efficiency in many different ways – starting producing goods 
consumers really want, not interrupting them with advertisements on what they are not 
interested in (thus saving them time) etc. When enjoying the benefits people often behave 
like they do not care about their privacy at all. They are either trading their privacy for some 
convenient services or they are sharing lots of details about their lives online just for the 
pleasure of sharing. Some people argue then that there is no need for protecting privacy 
when the people voluntarily share immense amounts of data about themselves with others. 
This results in the opinions that privacy is dead. But the voluntariness of sharing the data is 
questionable as will be described later and therefore the argument of the ‘dead privacy’ 
cannot be accepted. 
In my view, although many people treat their privacy as a commodity and trade it for 
services, they want to do it consciously and want their data to be used in the context they 
provided it in. Even people using every social network possible do not like to be surprised 
by what data is collected and processed without them knowing it. 
In addition to the possible disrespect of contexts, there is a problem with the bargaining 
power strength. The collectors are making use of the large market share they have or of the 
                                                             
21 Kühn, Z.: ‘Ochrana soukromí v internetové době’, in: Šimíček, V. (ed.): Právo na soukromí, Brno, 
Masarykova univerzita, 2011, p. 111 
22 Schermer, B. W.: ‘The Limits of Privacy in Automated Profiling and Data Mining‘, Computer Law and 
Security Review, 2011, 27 (1), pp. 45-52, at p. 49 
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technological architecture that enables them to collect data without obstacles. These are the 
conditions for success. The more customers and the more useful data you have, the more 
valuable your collection is. Exactly these things make finding solutions to the privacy 
protection problem so difficult. Either the collectors have to be deprived of that power or 
deprived of the possibilities of using it for whatever purposes they want. 
After covering general problematic concepts related to profiling, the following part lists all 
kinds of specific risks emerging in the context of data mining and profiling, describing them 
in more detail. 
Inaccuracy 
If the raw data (i.e. data before processing; might not be meaningful by itself) is inaccurate 
or unreliable, it may be problematic if decisions towards groups or individuals are being 
made on its grounds. Other risks like discrimination can have more severe consequences if 
based on inaccurate data.23 It is the task of data preparation step (preceding the data mining 
step) to assure a good quality of the raw data. In spite of that, mistakes can still occur. It can 
happen, that there is not enough data and individuals may be classified as members of a 
group even if they do not fit in it or may not be classified as members of a group they do fit 
in. These are called false positives and false negatives. The consequences may be either to 
the favour or to the detriment of the customer; the severance of the mistakes may vary. 
Although there are tools to fight against this issue like giving an individual a right to know 
what data is being held about him and a right to correct inaccuracies in the raw data or 
(again) data mining used for correcting mistakes, none of these methods is perfect, nor does 
any of them guarantee getting rid of all inaccuracies. On the contrary, they involve the same 
risk. Another problem is, if the conclusion (the result of the data mining), although based on 
true data, is wrong. However, so can be a human decision. Any protection against this is 
probably not possible. 
Discrimination 
Dividing individuals into groups and making different decisions towards them on this 
ground is the essential quality of profiling. Customers get different offers or promotions 
according to their date of birth, what they had purchased in the past or who they are. There 
                                                             
23 Schermer, B. W.: ‘The Limits of Privacy in Automated Profiling and Data Mining’, Computer Law and 
Security Review, 2011, 27 (1), pp. 45-52, at p. 48 
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are opinions (like the one of Zarsky),24 that these practices raise neither any legal issues, 
nor have any bad impact on the society. They just confirm how business works. Other 
opinion, as the one of Lessig, states that these profiling practices reconstitute the system of 
status and destroy the environment of equality that had been developed.25 He sees that as 
harmful for the society. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with trying to build a good 
relationship with customers who you want attract or keep. I do not see anything bad in this 
way the market works or any market failure that should be corrected except for price 
discrimination based on misusing information asymmetry to the detriment of consumer, 
which will be described further below. 
However, sometimes can be the differentiation illegal – if someone is treated less favourably 
and it is based on religion or belief, gender, sexual orientation, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, disability, property, birth or age (Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union). The problem is how to recognize such illegal discrimination. It is 
not necessary that the database includes the field of nationality or race, if it is possible to 
deduce that information from other fields, e.g. a location, and thus discriminate indirectly. 
Proving a discriminatory behaviour presupposes knowing the decision making procedure. 
However, the concrete steps that are taken before making a decision are not a public thing. 
They may even form a trade secret that deserves protection as well. 
According to Zarsky, data mining might offer a solution. As anti-discrimination laws should 
protect people against bigotry and subconscious resentment of other people, then in the 
case of data mining, which is done purely by machines, no such thing can happen. The only 
problem is that if decisions are made by the method of classification, it means, that the 
machine already got some hint on what the sorting criteria are. So the other method, 
clustering, should be used.26 But what if data mining methods find correlations that, as a 
result, differentiate on the basis of ‘forbidden criteria’? Is not the goal of anti-discriminatory 
laws to protect society against decisions based on these criteria? If the answer is yes, than I 
                                                             
24 Zarsky, T. Z.: ‘”Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining 
of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion’, Yale Journal of Law & Technology, 2002-
2003, 5, pp. 1-56, at p. 25 
25 According to Lessig, the system of hierarchy disappeared after the society became more mobile 
and flexible and it was no longer possible to track enough detailed information on people to make 
subtle distinctions between them according to their rank. Lessig, L.: Code version 2.0, New York, Basic 
Books, 2006, p. 221-222 
26 Zarsky, T. Z.: ‘”Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining 
of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion’, Yale Journal of Law & Technology, 2002-
2003, 5, pp. 1-56, at p. 27-29 
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cannot see how this problem is solved in Zarsky’s description. I think that if we want to 
protect society against these decisions, than it does not help if we say that machine analysis 
does not constitute a problem. I agree though, that the right place for regulation is within 
the field of anti-discriminatory laws and does not have to be repeated or specified 
differently in the data protection laws. 
Price Discrimination 
Consumer profiling combined with dynamic pricing may lead to price discrimination. Given 
enough information about consumers’ demand and preferences (especially out of their 
transactions history or information on their background), it may be possible to find out 
what is the highest price a consumer would be willing to pay for a good. This is exactly the 
amount the seller wants from every customer to maximize his revenues. If the price was 
higher, customer would not be interested in the purchase anymore. If it was lower, the profit 
would be not only on the seller’s side anymore, but on the customer’s as well, as he would 
have been ready to pay even more. 
Customers may even be manipulated by asking to pay a higher price for goods they urgently 
need or if he is in a hurry. Or the seller may remember that the customer was interested in 
a service yesterday, when the exchange rate was less advantageous for the seller than today, 
and therefore wanting the same (higher) price even a day later, when the exchange rate got 
better for the customer. Thanks to one-on-one marketing it is hard to reveal such 
manipulation. Even in case of revealing it, if the seller’s position on the market is strong 
enough (monopolistic), he does not have to be aware of losing customers because of his 
behaviour. 
 
Presumably, if the users knew that their data would be used in such a way, they would not 
provide it. Or at least not voluntarily. Or just for a proper compensation. The problem is that 
consumers are often not aware of what can happen with their data (they are uninformed, 
e.g. because of high transaction costs) or if they are, they have often only two options – be 
allowed to use the service and agree with providing the data or not providing the data and 
not being allowed to use the service, which raises other problems described later. 
De-individualisation and Stereotyping 
By using group profiles, people are being judged by characteristics that are true only with 
some probability for a specific individual (especially if the conclusion is made on the basis 
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of more than one factor). They are being treated as members of a group and not as 
individuals. Not all of the group characteristics have to be valid for them (as described 
earlier in Chapter 2). Individuals may thus feel injustice or being stigmatized. Moreover, if 
we count that people see themselves as developing morally, then judging them according to 
what has been collected about them so far cannot be totally reliable as the reality 
dynamically changes. 
A similar problem is stereotyping. Individuals are categorized into a few predefined 
categories that do not reflect all nuances of every personality. The profiles then work as 
stereotypes. This preempts individuals to present themselves. However, in my opinion, a 
stereotype must be known to a broad public to have these effects and in my opinion it is not 
the case of online profiling activities by businesses. It could have been the case, if the profiles 
got known to a broader public. 
Individual Autonomy 
Making a border between what is personal information people want to keep for themselves 
and what they want to share with public or businesses is crucial for a free development of 
their thoughts and identities. According to Velleman, persons “have a fundamental interest 
in being recognized as a self-presenting creature.”27 This means deciding in which circle of 
people and what information they find appropriate to disclose about themselves. The 
reason is that people are influenced by what other people think of them and what behaviour 
is socially desirable. 
The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany has acknowledged the importance of 
informational self-determination in his decision from December 15, 1983 (BVerfGE 65, 1 – 
Volkszählung) where it stated, that people must be able to ascertain who knows what about 
them and when. If they are unable to ascertain it, they may avoid behaviour that might cause 
harm to them and thus restrict their self-development.28 The court decision is orientated on 
                                                             
27 Velleman, J. D.: ‘The Genesis of Shame’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2001, 30, pp. 27-52, cited in: 
van den Hoven, J.: ‘Information Technology, Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data’, in: van den 
Hoven, J. and Weckert, J. (eds.): Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, p. 316 
28 In original version the courts’ statement is: “Mit dem Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung 
wären eine Gesellschaftsordnung und eine diese ermöglichende Rechtsordnung nicht vereinbar, in 
der Bürger nicht mehr wissen können, wer was wann und bei welcher Gelegenheit über sie weiß. 
Wer unsicher ist, ob abweichende Verhaltensweisen jederzeit notiert und als Information dauerhaft 
gespeichert, verwendet oder weitergegeben werden, wird versuchen, nicht durch solche 
Verhaltensweisen aufzufallen. Wer damit rechnet, daß etwa die Teilnahme an einer Versammlung 
oder einer Bürgerinitiative behördlich registriert wird und daß ihm dadurch Risiken entstehen 
können, wird abweichende Verhaltensweisen jederzeit notiert und als Information dauerhaft 
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data that the government had been collecting (the Court was deciding about the constitution 
conformity of data collection by the state during census). Does the same apply to data 
collected by private entities? Can we compare the power of a state and the power of a 
private entity? The state is definitely interested in collecting data for the purposes of tax 
and criminal investigation. After finding out the individuals the state can use its powers 
against them to enforce laws. Private entities are interested in increasing revenues and are 
able to target individuals according to the decisions they made themselves. In that sense, it 
is the same. Only the ‘legislative’ and the ‘executive’ power is not really divided in case of 
private entities in comparison to the state. The state must obey certain procedural rules to 
do enforcement lawfully. For the private entities there are some rules as well, however, 
their effectiveness or what happens in the case of not obedience is questionable (see 
Chapter 4). Private entities act as ‘legislators’ as well. They determine what data will be 
collected, for what purposes and how it will be used. As the other party (an individual) does 
not have any bargaining power it is something like a law for them with which they comply 
without even willing to. All in all, private entities with these powers are more powerful than 
governments, but it is governments that are more restricted than businesses. This 
imbalance has historical grounds and should be redressed. It may seem as an easy task as it 
is the state that would restrict someone else than itself. But because of the technology 
architecture it is not that easy to solve this problem as the legal regulation is not enough 
powerful regulatory tool. 
The profiling methods make manipulation of individuals by targeting advertising or 
information that users are looking for according to their interests (like in the case of search 
engines or media sites) easier. Manipulating and influencing the public is the essence of 
advertising. Its persuasive abilities can be even strengthened by targeting. The problems of 
this personalized advertising and informing may be: one-sided information, limiting the 
options (and thus normalizing) or pushing one to do things he would normally not do. Lessig 
                                                             
gespeichert, verwendet oder weitergegeben werden, wird versuchen, nicht durch solche 
Verhaltensweisen aufzufallen. Wer damit rechnet, daß etwa die Teilnahme an einer Versammlung 
oder einer Bürgerinitiative behördlich registriert wird und daß ihm dadurch Risiken entstehen 
können, wird möglicherweise auf eine Ausübung seiner entsprechenden Grundrechte (Art. 8, 9 GG) 
verzichten. Dies würde nicht nur die individuellen Entfaltungschancen des Einzelnen 
beeinträchtigen, sondern auch das Gemeinwohl, weil Selbstbestimmung eine elementare 
Funktionsbedingung eines auf Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitwirkungsfähigkeit seiner Bürger 
begründeten freiheitlichen demokratischen Gemeinwesens ist.“ Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Volkszählung, BVerfGE 65, 1 (43), Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 15. Dezember 1983 auf die mündliche 
Verhandlung vom 18. und 19. Oktober 1983, Az. 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83 
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asks, “When the system seems to know what you want better and earlier than you do, how 
can you know where these desires really come from?”29 
Another example of manipulation could be the case when a person suddenly changes their 
interests to the detriment of the seller (e. g. stops buying cigarettes and orders a nicotine 
patch) and he is pushed to change his decision back (getting special offers for cigarettes). 
These practices may have impact not only on the individual but on the whole society as well. 
Several scholars warn that too much personalizing may threaten the democracy and 
freedom itself. 30 As the private entities have the power to affect what content a user sees, 
people might be confronted only with issues and opinions they support or, in the worst 
scenario, they might be provided only with a content that the provider likes. Although 
people naturally tend to surround themselves with the information they like or agree with 
(e.g. buying left-wing or right-wing newspapers), the ease with which they can do it thank 
to personalization technologies is new. They do not even have to make an effort, the online 
content providers do that automatically as it gets visitors coming back to their websites. In 
my view, this is the difference from newspapers that try to catch attention of a broader 
public and therefore the probability of being confronted with information challenging the 
readers’ views is bigger. Not being confronted with other opinions or topics might lead to 
forming groups of people that no longer understand each other. This argument may sound 
a little far-fetched but it is necessary to have it in mind for the case that we would witness 
more specific dangers of that kind. Up until now, we witness rather the problems connected 
with making money, rather than trying to gain power and control public opinions. 
Richard Posner points out that people invoking right to privacy often want to hide 
discreditable information and manipulate people around them. The other party should not 
be prevented from revealing these deceptions. It is fully legitimate that both parties want 
information about the other one to protect itself against disadvantageous transactions.31 I 
think that what businesses are doing could be seen from this perspective as well. It is natural 
for both sides to search for all the possible relevant information and to reveal about 
themselves just the amount of information that is the most beneficiary for them, especially 
if it is about business transactions. Whereas the transaction costs of businesses of getting to 
                                                             
29 Lessig, L.: Code version 2.0, New York, Basic Books, 2006, p. 220 
30 E.g. Sunstein, C.: Republic.com 2.0, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009; Pariser, E.: The 
Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, New York, Penguin Press, 2011 
31 Posner, R. A.: ‘The Right of Privacy’, Georgia Law Review, 1978, 12 (3), pp. 393-422, cited in: Solove, 
D. J. et al.: Information Privacy Law, New York, Aspen Publishers, 2006, p. 41 
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know masses of their customers into the detail have got lower, the possibilities of 
consumers to reveal how they are being manipulated are still very constrained. If their only 
possibility not to be subject of data mining is not using hardly substitutable services, there 
is a question if there exists a market failure as customers do not really have a choice. Or they 
do only for the price of limiting themselves in full application of their right to self-
development. These two arguments, i.e. right to self-development and information 
asymmetry problem (described below) seem to me to be the most significant. 
Information Asymmetries 
Information asymmetry is a well-known market failure leading to power imbalance 
between the parties that requires to be corrected. 
As businesses collect huge amount of data about their customers and analyse them 
afterwards, they gain a lot of knowledge about them. This knowledge they may (mis)use for 
price discrimination, cutting certain groups from specific offers, precise targeting of 
advertisements or other media content and so on (as described above). All that with the 
purpose of increasing their revenues. On the other hand, the consumer hardly knows what 
knowledge the businesses have. They have no clue why such a decision is being made 
towards them, on what grounds. It is too hard for a consumer (if not impossible) to realize 
what data he is providing and how they contribute to his overall profile.32 Consumers do not 
have enough information to know what the fair price of information they are providing is 
and even if they had, they would hardly be in a position to negotiate about it. There is no 
transparent and fair market for the commodity of identity-relevant information until now. 
Abuse and Misuse of Profiles 
One of the things a person may consider before providing their data is the chance of misuse 
for fraudulent purposes or for damaging their reputation. Data protection law includes rules 
on confidentiality and security of processing data. Without proper data security data 
protection law would lose its meaning. However, data protection law applies only to 
processing of personal data, i.e. information relating to identified or identifiable natural 
person. Anonymized data are not subject to these rules. This may be problematic if the 
subject to whom this data relates to can be easily identified anyway. Issues like selling or 
other handovers of data and combining them with another databases could be seen as 
                                                             
32 Zarsky, T. Z.: ‘”Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining 
of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion’, Yale Journal of Law & Technology, 2002-
2003, 5, pp. 1-56, at p. 34 
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belonging under this sub-headline as well because the eventual misuse could have more 
severe consequences. 
Although the risk of misuse is real and the consequences of such conduct could be very 
unpleasant, data security will not be discussed in the following parts. It was mentioned 
briefly just to see the whole picture. 
 
Understanding the problems data mining presents is vital for the analysis of what solutions 
can be accepted. But first of all, we will look at the current legal framework.  
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4. Current Legal Framework and Its Drawbacks 
 
The previous chapters attempted to show that there is a strong incentive for businesses to 
collect as much data as possible to be able to mine them and use the gained knowledge as a 
tool for a further profit increase. Unless there is a strong and effective demand on the side 
of consumers for ceasing these practices, the only possibility to protect their interests is by 
legal regulation enacted by the states or better (to avoid obstacles to the single market), by 
the European Union. Now, we will look at the current legal framework. This work is going 
to focus on the EU legal framework. The following text will mainly describe data protection 
law (applied already in the stage of data collection) complemented by anti-discrimination 
law (that applies in the stage of profile application). Consumer protection law and e-
commerce law are not going to be covered as they do not contain important provisions on 
online profiling in the European Union, although they theoretically could. 
Data Protection Law 
The two main legal bodies in force in the EU are the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
(DPD) regulating processing of personal data and free movement of such data and the 
ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC regulating data protection and privacy in the digital age. For 
this thesis, the second Directive is relevant because of its Article 5 (3) regulating “cookies.” 
Although the reason for this provision is that the information (e.g. cookies) is saved in user’s 
terminal equipment that belongs to his private sphere and not because it is (or it is not) 
personal data, the description of the provision will be included in this chapter. These two 
legal frameworks were inspired by the OECD Privacy Principles (which are part of the OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data) which 
were developed in the 1970s and adopted in 1980 and the Council of Europe Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
(Convention 108) from 1981. Because not all of the EU member states had ratified and 
implemented the Council of Europe Convention 108 and there were differences in the 
regulation between the member states, the DPD was proposed in 1990.33 
                                                             
33 Nouwt, S: ‘Towards a Common European Approach to Data Protection: A Critical Analysis of Data 
Protection Perspectives of the Council of Europe and the European Union’, in: Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds.): 
Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, 2009, p. 275 
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DPD sets rules under which it is possible to process personal data of individuals. The main 
principles (articulated in the OECD Privacy Principles) are that personal data (i) must be 
processed fairly and lawfully, (ii) must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and processed only in a way compatible with those purposes, (iii) must be 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed, (iv) must be accurate, complete and where necessary kept up to 
date and (v) can be collected and processed only if the data subject34 has unambiguously 
given his consent or in other situations when it is ‘necessary.’ The data controller (vi) must 
inform the data subject of the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended 
(not later than at the time of collection) and of the recipients or categories of recipients of 
the data and (vii) he is responsible for the security of processing and the security of the 
personal data. The data subject (viii) has a right to obtain a confirmation from the controller 
whether or not data relating to him are being processed, has right to have the data rectified, 
erased, completed or amended if appropriate (“the individual participation principle”) and 
is entitled to obtain the knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data 
concerning him, at least in the case of the automated decisions. 
In January 2012, due to differences in the implementation of the DPD on the national level 
and technological progress leading to uncertainty how to deal with the risks associated, 
notably, with online activity, a new proposal on the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) was presented.35 In December 2015 the outcome of the final trialogue of the 
European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament was published. 
The final form was accepted by the European Parliament in April 2016. The GDPR will 
replace the DPD. The ePrivacy Directive will remain in effect. The goal of the legal regulation 
is to balance the privacy of data subjects and the interest on free flow of information.36 Since 
2007, due to the Lisbon treaty, the right to protection of personal data has become one of 
the fundamental rights – for the first time in legal history. It is set in Article 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU after the right to respect for private and family life, making 
                                                             
34 Data subject is an identified or identifiable natural person. (Article 2 (a) DPD as well as Article 4 
(1) GDPR) 
35 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM/2012/011 final - 2012/0011 
(COD) 
36 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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it something more than just an aspect of this general right to privacy.37 After publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union GDPR will enter into force and after two year 
transition period the Regulation will apply. 
In the following part it is going to be described how the DPD and ePrivacy Directive regulate 
different stages of online profiling, what are its drawbacks and if the GDPR helps solving the 
current problems and how. 
Collection Stage 
DPD applies when personal data are being processed. Not all of the data used for creating 
profiles must be personal. Thus, the question that has to be answered is whether personal 
data are being processed or not. This question seems easy to answer (e.g. in comparison to 
the question if there is a discrimination which is crucial for determination whether anti-
discrimination law applies). However, finding the answer is not always simple. 
The problem is the definition of personal data. DPD states in its Article 2(a) that “‘personal 
data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” The definition of 
personal data in the GDPR is the same like the one in DPD but includes more examples of 
identifiers, namely: “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, online identifier or to one or more factors specific to 
his physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that 
person.”  
According to the words of the GDPR definition, it could seem that all information connected 
to a technical identifier are personal data. However, there are exceptions if data are 
anonymized. Recital 23 states that “the principles of data protection should not apply to 
anonymous information, that is information which does not relate to an identified or 
identifiable natural person or to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data 
subject is not or no longer identifiable.” If the data is anonymized to the extent that it is no 
longer possible to identify an individual, it is not personal data. Anonymization must be 
distinguished from pseudonymisation. This is defined in Article 4 (5) GDPR as “processing 
                                                             
37 Blume, P.: ‘It Is Time for Tomorrow: EU Data Protection Reform and the Internet’, Journal of 
Internet Law, 2015, 18 (8), pp. 3-13, at p. 5 
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of personal data in such a way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific data 
subject without the use of additional information, as long as such additional information is 
kept separately and subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure non-
attribution to an identified or identifiable person.” Pseudonymised data stays personal data. 
Recital 23 states that “data which has undergone pseudonymisation, which could be 
attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information, should be considered as 
information of an identifiable natural person.” It is likely that in many cases online 
identifiers such as IP addresses, cookies and other tracking technologies are going to be 
subject to the GDPR. Recital 24 states in the current version that “individuals may be 
associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and 
protocols, such as Internet Protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such 
as Radio Frequency Identification tags. This may leave traces which, in particular when 
combined with unique identifiers or other information received by the servers, may be used 
to create profiles of the individuals and identify them.” In the version from 2012 
(Commission’s proposal) this text was followed by sentence: “It follows that identification 
numbers, location data, online identifiers or other specific factors as such need not 
necessarily be considered as personal data in all circumstances.” This sentence was deleted 
in the current version and the former version did not include the words “in particular 
when”, meaning that online identifiers only when combined with unique identifiers and 
other information received by the servers constitute personal data.38 The current wording 
thus lost its unambiguity but, in my view, still means that those online identifiers are not 
personal data as such. Hartung thinks there is a risk that the Recitals will not be taken into 
consideration by the appliers and that an interpretation will be used that they are personal 
data, which would have significant consequences for the businesses.39 
Another question is by whom the natural persons should be identifiable, if only by the 
controller or by any other person as well. The Recitals of both DPD and GDPR talk about the 
latter version but e.g. German courts have been deciding in favour of the former version. 
The risk of the latter approach is that almost everything could be considered personal data 
as it is almost always possible that someone exists who would be able to identify a person 
whom the data relates to. Custers points out the same risk because of technology providing 
                                                             
38 Council of the European Union, General Data Protection Regulation, Version 21/04/15, Council’s 
consolidated version of March 2015, available at: 
http://www.bvdw.org/fileadmin/downloads/mepo/Synopse_EUDSGVO_march-2015.pdf (15 
March 2016) 
39 Hartung, J.: ‘Neue Regulierungsaspekte in der EU-Datenschutzreform’, in: Weber, R. H. and 
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more and more means of linking data and increased dissemination of such data.40 According 
to the Recital 26 of the DPD determining whether a person is identifiable, account should 
be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used either by the controller or by any 
other person to identify the said person. The Recital 23 of the GDPR states the same and 
mentions in addition that the available technology, time, money and manpower should be 
taken into consideration as well. This is a clear attempt to limit the definition so that it is 
not too broad. If the definition was too broad, there would be a danger that data protection 
law would be too cumbersome and unable to really protect individual’s rights and freedoms. 
According to the possibility to identify an individual we can divide data to these categories: 
referential (data refers to a specific person, not just any person) and attributable (describe 
a situation or a fact without a reference to a specific person). Attributable data could go 
unprotected under the DPD definition.41 However, it may happen that attributable data will 
become referential. Schermer describes three situations when it can happen: 
1) adding referential data to attributable data, 
2) a profile becomes so unique that it fits only one individual,42 
3) linking a profile to an individual by means of unique identifiers (other than name, 
address or date of birth, e.g. an end device like a mobile phone or computer used by 
the individual).43 
Van den Hoven opines that even data that seem to have no meaning should be protected 
because if combined with other data or after applying new tools on them they may start 
making sense.44 This is why van den Hoven and Manders suggest to define the object of 
protection so that it includes not only referential data but attributable data as well, in terms 
of the notion of “identity relevant information.”45 
                                                             
40 Custers, B.: The Power of Knowledge. Ethical, Legal and Technological Aspects of Data Mining and 
Group Profiling in Epidemiology, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004, at p. 148 
41 van den Hoven, J.: ‘Information Technology, Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data’, in: van 
den Hoven, J. and Weckert, J. (eds.): Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 309 
42 A famous example is the ‘AOL searcher 4417749’. AOL published an anonymized dataset of search 
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43 Schermer, B.: ‘Risks of Profiling and the Limits of Data Protection Law’, in Custers, B. et al. (eds.): 
Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society, Berlin, Springer, 2013, p. 143-144 
44 van den Hoven, J.: ‘Information Technology, Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data’, in: van 
den Hoven, J. and Weckert, J. (eds.): Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 301 
45 van den Hoven, J.: ‘Information Technology, Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data’, in: van 
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Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 310 
30 
 
Data protection law of the EU fulfils this request with its concept of personal data (data 
relating to identified or identifiable natural person). According to the Article 29 Working 
Party Opinion 4/2007 on personal data, in the first situation described by Schermer an 
individual is indirectly identifiable, in the second situation an individual is indirectly 
identified and in the third he is directly identifiable because he can be distinguished from 
other individuals. As the Opinion states, “a name may itself not be necessary in all cases to 
identify an individual.” 
If a person is identifiable depends on a specific context. As already mentioned, for the data 
collectors it is often not important to know the exact identity (e.g. a name) of an individual. 
It is enough to recognize him as a member of a group and target him with a certain content. 
But the possibility to identify a person in combination with a cookie or similar tool makes 
data protection law to apply. If it is sufficient to single out a person (and it does not have to 
be a name), the associated profile is considered to be personal data.46 
According to the Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 2/2010 on behavioural advertising 
“the behavioural advertising methods described in this Opinion often entail the processing 
of personal data as defined by Article 2 (a) of Directive 95/46/EC and interpreted by Article 
29 Working Party. This is due to various reasons: i) behavioural advertising normally 
involves the collection of IP addresses and the processing of unique identifiers (through the 
cookie). The use of such devices with a unique identifier allows the tracking of users of a 
specific computer even when dynamic IP addresses are used. In other words, such devices 
enable data subjects to be 'singled out', even if their real names are not known. ii) 
Furthermore, the information collected in the context of behavioural advertising relates to 
(i.e. is about) a person's characteristics or behaviour and it is used to influence that 
particular person. This view is further confirmed if one takes into account the possibility for 
profiles to be linked at any moment with directly identifiable information provided by the 
data subject, such as registration related information. Other scenarios that can lead to 
identifiability are mergers, data losses and the increasing availability on the Internet of 
personal data in combination with IP addresses.” Based on that we can come to a conclusion 
that most if not all profiling exercises fall within the scope of the DPD.47 
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Data subjects whose personal data are being processed must be (among others) provided 
information about the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended and the 
recipients or categories of recipients of the data and the existence of the right of access and 
the right to rectify the data concerning them (Article 10 (b) and (c) DPD and Articles 13 
(1)(c), (e) and (f) GDPR). These rights are of the biggest importance in the sphere of 
profiling. The problem is that the purposes are sometimes specified too broadly or it is not 
clear what data are used for them. Only if personal data are further processed for historical, 
statistical or scientific purposes, it is not considered incompatible with the given purposes 
so the data subject does not have to be informed of these, but only provided that the data 
are not used to support measures or decisions regarding any particular individual (Recital 
29). So this legal base cannot be used for the group profiling purposes.48 
Article 6 (1)(c) DPD (and similarly Article 5 (1)(c) GDPR) states that personal data must be 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed. On one hand, there is a requirement on data minimisation so that 
only the data that is really necessary is processed. On the other hand, requiring that the data 
is adequate means that there has to be enough information so that the profile is accurate.49 
These two requirements are thus a little bit contradictory. By limiting the range of data that 
may be processed the risk raises that the data mining will come to false results and will no 
more be as useful as expected.50 
We can see that a series of tricky questions has to be answered to decide whether DPD (or 
GDPR) applies. The wording of the notion “personal data” has not changed much so the 
difficulty with answering this question if something is personal data or not is still the same. 
If the question is answered affirmatively, the collector must not forget about his information 
duties and must keep a certain quality of the data. 
Construction of Profiles and Anonymization 
Profiles are generally created by using data that has been anonymized. Anonymization is 
one of means of processing according to Article 2 (b) DPD (according to Article 4 (2) GDPR 
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as well).51 If there is no connection of the data to an identifiable person, data protection law 
does not apply. The step of anonymization looks appealing for privacy advocates but in fact, 
it may mean that individuals are less protected. If profiles are based on anonymized data, 
neither the subject whose data were used for constructing the profiles, nor the subject to 
whom the profile is applied have the rights of individual participation because the DPD does 
not apply. 
Because anonymization falls within the term “processing”, the rights of the data subject in 
relation to anonymization are: right to be informed of it (Articles 10 and 11 DPD and Articles 
13 and 14 GDPR)52, provide consent to it (Article 7 DPD and Article 6 (1) GDPR) and object 
to the processing (Article 14 DPD and Article 21 GDPR). 
According to Article 7 DPD and Article 6 (1) GDPR, the processing of personal data is lawful 
either if the subject has given consent to it or if it is “necessary” according to one of the other 
five conditions listed in the Articles. The problems of giving a consent that is freely given 
and informed will be described later. Another problem is that even if consent is not given 
and data are anonymized, it is impossible for the subject to find out that his data were used. 
Processing of data by means of anonymization without a consent could probably be 
legitimized also according to Article 7 (f) DPD (and similarly according to Article 6 (1)(f) 
GDPR) which states that personal data may be processed if “processing is necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or 
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection 
under Article 1 (1).” 
According to Article 14 (a) DPD, at least in the situation that data is processed on the 
grounds of Article 7 (f) DPD, the data subject has a right “to object at any time on compelling 
legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to 
him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there is a justified 
objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data.” The 
                                                             
51 The broad definition covers practically everything. Article 2 (b) DPD states that processing “shall 
mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
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retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure or transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.” 
52 Users should be informed that their data can be anonymized and used for construction of profiles. 
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GDPR includes such right in Article 21 (1) but puts the data subject in a better position. The 
data subject “shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular 
situation, at any time” and “the controller shall no longer process the personal data unless 
the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which 
override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject.” In that case it is the 
controller that has to demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds, not the data subject. 
In any case, even if consent is given, Article 14 (b) DPD grants the data subject right “to 
object, on request and free of charge, to the processing of personal data relating to him 
which the controller anticipates being processed for the purposes of direct marketing, or to 
be informed before personal data are disclosed for the first time to third parties or used on 
their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to 
object free of charge to such disclosures or uses.” The GDPR enhances this protection 
because apart from Article 21 (2) that gives the data subjects “right to object at any time to 
the processing of personal data concerning him or her for such (direct) marketing, which 
includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing,” it adds in Article 
21 (3) that “where the data subject objects to the processing for direct marketing purposes, 
the personal data shall no longer be processed for such purposes” under any circumstances. 
Both of the rights in Article 21 (1) and in Article 21 (2) “shall be explicitly brought to the 
attention of the data subject and shall be presented clearly and separately from any other 
information.” However, the fact that it is the data subject who has to take the initiative is 
probably the reason why the right to object to processing of personal data is seldom 
exercised. 
Regarding construction of profiles one more topic will be discussed: processing of “sensitive 
data.” Article 8 (1) DPD and Article 9 (1) GDPR prohibit the processing of sensitive 
attributes (ethnicity, religion etc.) if explicit consent is not given or other conditions are not 
met (e.g. data manifestly made public by the data subject etc.). Moreover, GDPR prohibits in 
Article 22 (4) profiling based only on sensitive data (unless the data subject has given 
explicit consent to it). It was already mentioned that current profiling technologies make it 
possible to deduce those information from other data, e.g. a postal code, a level of education 
etc., but this case is not explicitly regulated. 
All in all, even if data is anonymized, the data subject must be informed that their data can 
be anonymized and used for construction of profiles, he must provide consent to it unless 
the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests of the enumerated 
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subjects and depending on the basis of processing (consent or necessity) he has the 
respective right to object to the construction of profiles. In case of sensitive data the rules 
are slightly stricter. 
Application of Profiles 
After the profile is constructed the individuals to whom it is applied should have a right to 
know what the mechanism of the profile, that has been applied to them, is. Article 12 (a), 
third dash of the DPD gives every data subject the right to obtain knowledge of the logic 
involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the 
automated decisions referred to in Article 15 (1) DPD. The problem is that, out of a 
definition of ‘data subject,’ if no personal data are processed, no information has to be 
provided. Further, the data controller may simply add a feature to make it seem like that the 
decision is not fully automated and avoid the obligation to provide knowledge of the logic. 
Another article related to profiling is Article 15 DPD. It gives protection to “every person,” 
giving them “right not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning 
him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data 
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at 
work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct etc.” There are some ambiguities in this 
formulation. Firstly, what decisions are and secondly, which of them have legal effects or 
significantly affect an individual. Recital 58 of the GDPR gives examples of “automatic 
refusal of an on-line credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human 
intervention.” Bygrave asks if advertising banners adjusting their content according to a 
visitor involve a decision being made as well.53 Most probably, if it was considered as a 
decision, it would not have significant effects on the website visitor. 
Article 22 (1) GDPR gives the same right to every data subject (not every person) and 
broadens the grounds when the data subject is not granted a right not to be subject to an 
automated decision. Not only when it is necessary for entering into, or performance of a 
contract and in cases authorized by law which also lays down suitable measures to 
safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms and legitimate interests, but also if he gave his 
explicit consent. 
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Profiling’, Computer Law & Security Report, 2001, 17 (1), pp. 17-24, at p. 19 
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In this case, it is again the natural person or the data subject who has to take the initiative 
to protect himself. A problem could be that in some situations the individual does not need 
to know that a profile is being applied to them. There is only a general information 
obligation in the case of existence of automated decision making that produces legal effects 
concerning him or significantly affects him (Article 13 (2)(f) GDPR). 
Articles 7 (f) DPD and 6 (1)(f) GDPR state that personal data may be processed without the 
consent of the data subject if it is necessary for the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller. Zuiderveen Borgesius analyses the possibility of basing processing of personal 
data for behavioural targeting on this provision and comes to a negative conclusion. Only in 
exceptional circumstances, like a bookstore processing the data to provide 
recommendations on its website, it might be allowed. But in other cases, even if the ad 
network had a legitimate interest (because of the freedom to conduct a business) and the 
processing would be necessary (they would prove that the large-scale tracking of people’s 
behaviour is substantial for targeting individuals), the data subject’s fundamental rights 
would in the end prevail.54 On the other hand, Kotschy, when analysing the consequences of 
the new Regulation, points to formulation that European Parliament proposed to include in 
Article 6 (1)(f) and what is now included in Recital 47 GDPR. It states that the processing 
must meet the reasonable expectations of the data subjects that processing for this purpose 
might take place in the context of the relationship between the data subject and the 
controller. According to Kotschy, everybody knows nowadays that the free internet services 
are paid by providing data used for marketing purposes. This further use would then be 
lawful (as everybody can reasonably expect it) and the protection of customers would not 
be enhanced.55 
To sum up, application of profiles is connected with certain rights of individuals (natural 
persons or data subjects): right to obtain knowledge of the logic on which the automated 
decision is based, right not to be subject to an automated decision which produces legal 
effects concerning him or significantly affects him. Applying these rights presupposes 
knowledge of the fact that an automated decision is being made towards the individual. 
There are different opinions on the question whether consent of the data subject is needed 
for using personal data for marketing purposes. 
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Basis?’, International Data Privacy Law, 2015, 5 (3), pp. 163-174, at pp. 167-169 
55 Kotschy, W.: ‘The Proposal for a New General Data Protection Regulation – Problems Solved?’, 
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Consent to the Processing of Personal Data 
Consent means according to Article 2 (h) DPD “any freely given specific and informed 
indication of his (data subject’s) wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to 
personal data relating to him being processed.” According to Article 7 DPD the data subject 
has to unambiguously give his consent to the processing of his personal data. It means that 
silence is not enough. An opt-out system is usually criticised as not sufficient for obtaining 
a consent either.56 The data controller must be able to provide evidence that the data subject 
consented. 
According to Article 7 (1) GDPR, consent should be given by a clear affirmative action. 
According to the Recital 25 a clear affirmative action means ticking a box when visiting an 
Internet website, choosing technical settings for information societal services or any other 
statement or conduct that clearly indicates the data subject’s acceptance of the processing 
of their personal data. It means the opt-in system. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity 
should not constitute consent. Giving consent should not be hidden in the general terms any 
more. Article 7 (4) GDPR states that “when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost 
account shall be taken of the fact, whether, among others, the performance of a contract … 
is made conditional on the consent to the processing of data that is not necessary for the 
performance of this contract.” This wording sounds promising and it will be interesting to 
see what effect it will have. 
Svantesson describes the thought of everyone giving free and informed consent as a 
“fairytale concept”.57 First of all, no one reads long descriptions of things he does not 
understand. Secondly, use of many free services that one may need for work or anything 
else important, is based on giving consent. Thirdly, it can happen so many times a day that 
it would take too much time to read everything carefully. And lastly, if a person reads what 
he is giving consent to, it does not mean he is able to really understand all consequences 
tied with it. Giving informed consent is almost impossible. 
In the case of profiling exercises, when an identifier is used to read or write information to 
the terminal equipment, e.g. a cookie, Article 5 (3) of the ePrivacy Directive applies. It states 
that “storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the 
terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber 
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or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and 
comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the 
purposes of the processing.” This requires a prior consent, i.e. an opt-in system. Consent 
may be given by settings of a browser.58 Despite this consent, another one is needed if a 
company uses a tracking cookie to process personal data because Article 5 (3) of the 
ePrivacy Directive does not automatically provide legal basis for processing of personal 
data.59 
We can see that the concept of informed and freely given consent is stricter and less 
ambiguously described in GDPR in comparison to DPD. A consent is needed for processing 
personal data of a data subject and for storing cookies on the user’s terminal equipment 
unless other conditions are met that allow to do these activities without a consent. The 
concept of a consent is criticised as providing no real protection. 
General Data Protection Regulation – Important News 
Newly, GDPR includes in its Article 4 (4) the definition of profiling as following: “‘profiling’ 
means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of using those data to 
evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or 
predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, 
health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.” The 
processing has to be automated and according to the Recital 24 it is particularly an activity 
that leads to taking decisions or predicting the data subject’s behaviour. The data subject 
has a right to be informed of the consequences of profiling decisions (Articles 13 and 14 
GDPR). Recital 70 indicates that profiling can be related to direct marketing but does not 
have to be at whole extent. In the case that it is, the data subject has the right to object to 
profiling according to Article 19 (2) GDPR. Always when there is an automated decision 
based on profiling which produces legal effects or significantly affects him, the data subject 
must be informed about the logic involved as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for them (Article 13 (2)(f) GDPR). 
GDPR takes into account the possible discriminatory effects of decisions based on profiling, 
i.e. if based on race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or beliefs, trade union 
membership, genetic or health status, or sexual orientation, and states in Recital 58 that a 
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controller should use adequate mathematical or statistical procedures and implement 
technical and organisational measures to prevent those discriminatory effects. However, in 
the binding text of the Regulation there is no such obligation. 
In comparison to DPD the GDPR enhances in its Article 3 (2) the territorial scope of the EU 
data protection law as it will apply every time when personal data of data subjects residing 
in the Union is processed, where the processing activities are related to (a) the offering of 
goods or services to data subjects in the Union or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as 
far as their behaviour takes place within the European Union, even if the controller is 
established outside of the EU. This clearly encompasses the profiling activities. 
Other new provisions contained in GDPR that are enhancing the protection of individuals 
are “right to be forgotten” (Article 17), right to data portability (Article 20) and the 
obligation of a controller to process data in accordance with the principles of privacy by 
design and privacy by default. The last obligation will be described in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
The form of regulation (and not directive as it has been so far) means stronger 
harmonization because regulation is directly part of the national law. However, practical 
applications are then on national data protection supervisory authorities and courts (unless 
CJEU gives their opinion on a subject). Legal terms and standards that are too general leave 
space for possible different applications of the same provision. The future will show if the 
intention of stronger harmonization succeeds. 
 
All in all, we may see that the current data protection legislation is based on ex ante 
protection, not ex post protection. It is based on the presumption that it is possible to hide 
the information from observation easily, which is no more the case. Also, it is no more the 
input but the output (determining the decisions) that matters. As data collecting is here to 
stay because in many cases it is inevitable or wanted, Zarsky points out that the regulation 
should focus more on how data are used, i.e. on the later stage than the collection stage.60 
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Another common criticism of data protection law is that it includes only procedural rules. 
The regulated subjects only look at if they comply with those rules but do not really care if 
there are any real privacy threats as a consequence of their conduct. 
Anti-discrimination Law 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides protection 
against discrimination when enjoying other rights protected by the Convention. Protocol 
No. 12 to the Convention broadens the protection against discrimination to all rights 
ensured, not only to those mentioned in the Convention. 
Other international treaties containing prohibition of discrimination are: the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
These treaties provide protection against public authorities. They do not apply directly if 
discriminatory behaviour occurs between private parties. However, it is considered that the 
protection might be used in case of clear omission to protect individuals against 
discrimination by setting no obligations to private parties not to discriminate. It is the task 
of the national legislator to enact suitable laws. Theoretically, this may be applied to 
profiling practices as well.61 
The national anti-discrimination laws are binding for private parties. In the Czech Republic, 
discrimination is forbidden regarding access to goods and services that are offered to a 
broad public. In the European Union such behaviour is forbidden by the Directives if based 
on sex, race, or ethnicity. Cases of such discrimination happened in the United States.62 
The conditions of discriminatory behaviour are: (i) different treatment between two 
persons or groups (ii) in analogous or relevantly similar situations (iii) without an objective 
and reasonable justification, i.e. pursuing a legitimate aim.63 It has to be proved that a person 
or a group was treated differently because of different characteristics. If the burden of proof 
is on the claimant, he is in a hard position as the decision mechanisms are not public. Only 
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in some cases, e.g. in the Czech Republic if discriminated on the grounds of ethnicity, race 
or sex in access to goods and services, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.64 
However, there is no general agreement on prohibition of discrimination between private 
parties when it comes to providing services as the freedom of choosing the contractual party 
is a very important principle of private law.  
                                                             





We have seen that there are many different interests that have to be balanced and that 
especially the interest of individuals on not having to choose between being excluded from 
using services or giving up control over huge amount of data about themselves is not 
sufficiently put through. Some people are downplaying this issue, saying that individuals 
should simply stop worrying about privacy. In 1999 the former CEO of Sun Microsystems 
Scott McNealy said: “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”65 Advocates of this view 
say that there is too much information flowing around to regulate it and all rules would be 
unenforceable anyway. You cannot stop the technology. However, as described in Chapter 
3, the data mining techniques can lead to consequences that require intervention. It is true, 
though, that emerging technologies complicate finding the right solution. 
Regulation of this issue does not have to be done only by laws. On the contrary, it is almost 
necessary to use other means as well. Lawrence Lessig describes in his book four types of 
regulation: law, norms (e.g. ethical ones), market and architecture.66 States can impose 
obligations and sanctions by laws, businesses can voluntarily regulate themselves by setting 
norms for their conduct, the demand for certain behaviour can be so strong that the invisible 
hand of the market will make it happen or whoever is in the power of designing the 
architecture of systems can enable only certain behaviour. 
I have collected suggestions for improvements from “cosmetic measures” to more radical 
ones. I think the best solution would be the one that does not require drastic changes of 
legal or market environment but, at the same time, would eliminate the disadvantages of 
the current situation. I will try to introduce the solutions in this order while respecting the 
category of problems they fall into. As Zarsky describes, in order to find a suitable solution 
we have to make three inquires: (i) whether the proposal really solves the problem, (ii) what 
its side effects are and (iii) whether the outcome is fair and achieves equity among the 
participants in the information market.67 These questions will be asked by each proposition 
together with the question if there are not too big obstacles to its realization. 
                                                             
65 Sprenger, P.: ‘Sun on Privacy: Get Over It’, Wired, 26 January 1999, available at: 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (17 March 2016) 
66 Lessig, L.: Code version 2.0, New York, Basic Books, 2006, p. 138 
67 Zarsky, T.: ‘Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-based Solutions for the Troubles 
of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet Society’, Maine Law Review, 2004, 




The first problem to be discussed is the fairytale, i.e. uninformed and/or not freely given 
consent. Kotschy criticises this concept and gives suggestions on how to ensure that the 
consent is really informed. He acknowledges that most people do not have enough time and 
knowledge to understand the long privacy policies and suggests that several expert 
institutions would check the legitimacy of processing. He sees a potential in Articles 36 and 
42 GDPR that go in this direction.68 
Articles 35 and 36 say that the data controller shall carry out a data protection impact 
assessment in cases where data are processed for taking decisions based on profiling those 
data. If the result of the data protection impact assessment shows that there are high risks 
to the rights and freedoms of individuals, the supervisory authority should be consulted 
prior to the processing of personal data. It is the supervisory authority’s task to use its 
powers to correct the measures that should be taken to protect individuals’ rights and 
freedoms. 
Article 42 presumes establishment of data protection certificates (seals and marks) 
demonstrating compliance with GDPR. It would be relatively easy to understand who 
complies with certain standards and if consumers got used to pay attention to it, businesses 
would be motivated to apply those standards to get certified. 
The certification mechanisms have not been done yet so it is premature to assess if they are 
really able to protect individuals. The efficiency of these certification mechanisms would 
depend a lot on its final form. The GDPR involves so many open formulations that it would 
depend on their interpretation how broad the protection of individuals’ rights would be in 
the end.69 But generally, the advantage of this approach would be the user-friendliness and 
unburdening of individuals when assessing the level of their data protection. On the other 
hand, there would be not much space for adjusting the protection to individual wishes as 
the level of protection would be uniform. All the data collectors would have to be treated 
the same to ensure the equity among them and to ensure that individuals can rely on the 
results of these procedures. 
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Svantesson points to the fairytale concept of an informed and freely given consent as well 
and suggests a “nanny state” approach to data protection that would ban certain types of 
contract terms in certain types of contracts.70 Individuals would not have the possibility to 
agree to certain terms and there would be no need for the fairytale consent. For answering 
the questions if this proposal would solve the problem and if the outcome would be fair 
would be decisive how the state would control and enforce the rules. The particular wording 
of the provisions would be decisive for assessment if it is not too strict and if it does not 
enshrine the business activities too much to the detriment of the consumer – these might 
be the negative side effects. 
Overcharging As a Consequence of Information Asymmetry 
Price discrimination, when used for overcharging customers by misusing information 
asymmetry, is unfair. Zarsky suggests solving the price discrimination problem by 
promoting secondary markets where customers would communicate with each other, 
creating a flow of information about the products and thus enabling revealing price 
discrimination practices. To implement this idea, an architecture for communication is 
needed that is independent on the seller, e.g. a “chat room” affiliated to the website.71 
Ensuring that these “chat rooms” are really independent would be probably hard to realize. 
But if that would be managed, it would be an elegant solution using market forces. However, 
I am not sure if it would solve the whole problem – customers that are in a hurry would 
probably not check the “chat rooms” as it would still take time to the customer to find the 
relevant information, not speaking of sharing the information with others. 
Not relying on this market solution, a legal solution could be a ban on the price 
discrimination to the detriment of consumer (overcharging in case of dire need etc.) that 
could find place in the consumer protection law. The question would be than how to find 
out that this behaviour occurred to be able to enforce it. We can see that the market solution 
with its “chat rooms” could help with the first problem but again, making them work is the 
weakest point. 
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The absence of knowledge and information on what data are collected and what happens 
with them brings some problems that require intervention. One of the things that remains 
private are the algorithms used for data mining, i.e. for the revelation of correlations and for 
the application of profiles. After the GDPR is in effect, the logic of the algorithms leading to 
taking decisions that are significant towards the individual will have to be revealed already 
at time when data are obtained. However, it does not mean that the user will be notified that 
the content he sees has been personalized. The obligation to do that could help individuals 
to be more aware of the fact what their data are used for and in what situations decisions 
are being taken towards them. This measure would need just a change of legislation. 
Weitzner et al. have the opinion that we should design information infrastructure 
differently in order to enable society to control that the data collected about individuals are 
correct and that the automated decision processes towards them are logically grounded on 
permissible uses of personal information. This “transparency by design” architecture would 
help controlling whether the data is used only in legally-approved ways. The legal 
requirements would have to make such mechanisms available and effective, i.e. set rules on 
how broad the individuals’ access rights would be, what would be the mechanism for 
correction of data, what would happen if incorrect data was used although the data subject 
had pointed out to that fact etc.72 It would probably be difficult for most people to 
comprehend how exactly the data have been used if they wanted to check it. However, this 
is the same thing as with legal documents. It would probably be enough that at least some 
people would be able to understand that and be able to point to the eventual failures. 
Few Control Over Data by the Data Subjects 
The current technology architecture and market forces give businesses much power when 
it comes to data processing. In this section will be described how the users could gain more 
control over their data. 
                                                             
72 Weitzner, D. J. et al.: ‘Transparency and End-to-End Accountability: Requirements for Web Privacy 
Policy Languages’, available at: https://www.w3.org/2006/07/privacy-ws/papers/34-weitzner-
transparency-accountability/ (18 March 2016) 
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Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
According to Lessig, nowadays we have architectures that deny individuals control over 
their data. He sees the way to respond to that in the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
that would enable machine-to-machine negotiations.73  
P3P is a platform that stores the user’s privacy preferences in a machine readable form and 
checks whether a website that expresses its policy in the same form complies with the user’s 
ones. Thus, reading of long legal documents to check whether the website the user is visiting 
is consistent with his requirements or not is no more needed. E.g. the user would want to 
be notified if the website asked for his e-mail address that can be given to third parties, but 
not if the website asked for it to pursue a contract with the user. The legislation would have 
to make it an obligation to include those machine readable privacy policy descriptions on 
the websites and make them enforceable.74 
As a result, the user would have an immediate overview of the website’s privacy policy, thus 
having more control over who knows what about him. This technological solution enables 
to take into account the different individual’s wishes. The outcome is fair for the participants 
because the privacy policy applied is negotiated between them beforehand. However, the 
question is if users would not be forced to have their settings in compliance with the 
website’s settings to be able to use the services offered. If so, everyone would have their 
settings according to the requirements of the website. This problem is not solved by P3P. 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) 
Other tools helping to strengthen the protection of user’s privacy are PETs. PETs are 
information and communication technologies enhancing individuals’ control over collecting 
and processing their personal data or preventing too extensive processing of data. Examples 
of these techniques are anonymizers (hiding the real online identity), encryption tools, 
privacy proxies etc. Generally, they have narrow field of application. They can help to 
protect certain aspect that is needed to protect privacy as a whole, meaning that they 
function for the purpose of privacy protection rather if more of them are combined together 
and if the person knows what he is doing. E.g. data confidentiality (through cryptography 
and secure systems) and anonymous communication (that the real identity of the person 
that is leaving traces is hidden) are not enough to protect privacy. The anonymizers are 
                                                             
73 Lessig, L.: Code version 2.0, New York, Basic Books, 2006, p. 232 
74 Lessig, L.: Code version 2.0, New York, Basic Books, 2006, p. 228 
46 
 
limited by how big the anonymity set (the group out of which the user can be distinguished) 
is and the power of observer (how easy is for him to analyse the information he has to 
identify the subject). Moreover, in the online environment using categorization, where the 
consumer’s digital identity is his real identity, anonymizers do not protect against unwanted 
behaviour that is not based on the unique identity. Hence, in this case, PETs offer customers 
only a false perception of autonomy.75 In spite of that, as already said, they can be a useful 
tool to protect privacy when combined together, which will be shown in the following 
section. 
Privacy by Design 
The main goal of Privacy by Design is that information technology systems are designed as 
protecting privacy from the beginning. The difference from PETs is that it is a whole system 
architecture that is created. To implement the architecture, appropriate PETs are used. The 
tools must cooperate on the level of the system so that it is able to protect privacy. The 
architecture should comply with all the data protection principles, as formulated by OECD. 
The users should have the possibility to set the systems to their wanted level of protection 
as different users have different wishes and expectations.76 
In GDPR we can see support for these systems. Article 25 states that the controller shall 
implement appropriate technical and organisational measures which are designed to 
implement data protection principles and protect the rights of data subjects. Of course 
having regards to the state of the art and the costs of implementation. The controller may 
get a certificate that he complies with these Regulation requirements. So officially, there is 
a requirement for Privacy by Design but practically we cannot exactly say what it is, which 
makes the enforcement difficult. 
Data Ownership and the Real Data Market 
The fact that the customers do not participate, or just for a small countervalue, on the huge 
profits that customers’ data brings businesses leads Grassegger to the idea of 
“retransforming” the market pretty radically. He suggests that individuals save most of their 
                                                             
75 Zwick, D. and Dholakia, N.: ‘Whose Identity Is It Anyway? Consumer Representation in the Age of 
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the Privacy as Confidentiality Paradigm’, in: Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds.): Data Protection in a Profiled 
World, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 309 
76 Le Metayer, D.: ‘Privacy By Design: A Matter of Choice’, in: Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds.): Data Protection 
in a Profiled World, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 325 
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data on their own servers or clouds to which would have access only those willing to pay 
for it. Every individual could have their own General Terms that would have to be accepted 
by the accessing party. He suggests creating a market for data where data would be 
provided only if reasonable equivalent value is offered back.77 This would reduce the power 
imbalance between the parties on the information market. According to Cohen, trading 
information on this market would have a good side effect as it would develop the capacity 
for autonomous choice by individuals and thus bring benefit to the whole democratic 
society.78 
This step would need a legislation constituting data about an individual their own property. 
Cohen says that property is simply how we talk about important things. If something is not 
owned, it is presumed to be accessible to all.79 Whoever would use the data in an 
incompatible way could be sued on the basis of property rights. This measure would give 
the individuals the whole control over their data. 
Personal Data Stores 
The last technological solution that is going to be introduced combines features of 
previously mentioned solutions. It was invented on the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology80, taking into account the current political and legal context and offering its 
users to have their data being collected in their own “Personal Data Stores (PDSs).” Special 
software would accept requests (the code to be run against the data) from applications on 
the end-device of the user and then would send back an answer to the question (the output 
of the code) that the application wants, e.g. it would send back in which geographic zone the 
user is, but not the raw data (i.e. the exact location he spends time at).81 There would be 
higher chance that the answers are anonymized. The user would save his personal data 
store on his own server or in a cloud of his choose. Data collection and processing would 
happen there and the user would have full control of it. One of the side effects would be 
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lowering the market entry barriers for new businesses because they would have the data 
always available in PDSs and would not have to collect them again on their own.82 This is 
why businesses might be interested in this solution as well. To realize this idea would either 
mean using the market forces and persuading some large businesses to encourage it or to 
make a brand new legal regulation that would enact it. 
 
Summing up, we can see that there are two different approaches – either the “nanny state” 
one, where the state aims to protect individuals whether they want or not or the one giving 
more powers to individuals to be able to have control over their data. Many of the 
propositions solve only part of the problems relating with profiling. To me, the new project 
of the PDSs have the biggest potential to solve all of the problems. However, bigger 
discussion of broader public about the practical sides of its realization would be needed. 
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In this thesis I tried to explain why it is important to protect privacy in the era of new 
technologies that make possible deducing a lot of details about individuals that are 
identifiable with a high probability despite not using the “traditional personal data” (name, 
address etc.). The reasons were: possible discrimination, de-individualisation, 
manipulation and other misuses of information asymmetry or the severe consequences that 
misuse of data might have. 
So far, when it came to privacy protection, the EU data protection law used to concentrate 
on the collection stage, especially. The logic was that to protect the data, they should be kept 
private as much as possible and can be collected only if necessary or if the data subject 
consented. However, nowadays when it is possible to collect vast amounts of data and get 
consent to its processing easily, it is more important to focus on how the data is used. The 
weaknesses of legal regulation have led to approach that technology must be involved as 
well. GDPR came with data protection by default, data protection by design and other 
requirements that show attempt to better respond to the current problems with privacy 
and data protection but unfortunately affirms that fighting with the problems by legal 
regulation is not easy. It is hard to describe exactly what the controller’s obligations are and 
enforce it. The open and sometimes vague terms are not enough to make things change. 
They are necessary though in complementing other forms of regulation (norms, market and 
architecture). 
The solutions proposed in this thesis are mostly mixtures of these different forms of 
regulations. They either incline to giving more power and responsibility to individuals that 
can decide what happens with their data or they give the task to ensure a good standard of 
protection to the state. That means that either the users will carry the burden of controlling 
their data or they will not have choice, e.g. to provide their data because of strict rules on 
data minimisation or to demand stricter level of privacy than the state would require. 
Solutions like data ownership and storing data on some kind of personal data stores 
enabling control over what is being done with the data look the most realistic to me. I think 
the users should have the option to use something like personal data stores and not be 
excluded from using information society services. The consequence would probably be that 
not so many services would be for free but nowadays, with the possibility to have so many 
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customers, the prices would probably not be very high. However, the reactions to the idea 
of realizing the concept of PDSs are hard to predict. It has not been a subject of much debate. 
It would be interesting to hear the opinions on that from broader public. 
This thesis did not cover all aspects of online profiling due to capacity reasons. Another large 
relating issue are e.g. territoriality of data protection law and transborder data flows. An 
eventual following work could include those topics as well as more detailed insight into the 
solution using PDSs and what would be needed to do if the PDSs solution should really start 




Teze v českém jazyce 
(dle požadavku čl. 43 odst. 3 Pravidel pro organizaci studia na PF UK) 
 
Profilování a právní úprava ochrany soukromí 
 
V médiích i vědeckých publikacích se často mluví o tom, že žijeme v tzv. informační době. 
Informace se v dnešní ekonomice stávají stále důležitější komoditou a někdy se označují 
jako ropa 21. století. Pro spoustu společností je shromažďování a analyzování dat základem 
úspěchu jejich podnikání. Sbírají informace o svých uživatelích, o jejich zázemí, zájmech, 
nákupních zvycích a o všem, co by jim pomohlo zjistit o nich co nejvíce. Často mají již 
samotná data obrovskou hodnotu, od níž se pak odvíjí i hodnota společnosti, případně jsou 
data ještě zpracovávána a zisk je tvořen z využívání výsledků jejich analýzy. 
Ke zpracování velkého množství dat slouží metody data miningu. Data mining je proces 
hledání korelací mezi daty. Pokud jsou jeho výsledky použity pro tvorbu profilů, mluvíme o 
procesu profilování. Každý profil obsahuje např. návrhy, jaký obsah reklamy zacílit na 
jednotlivce, který do tohoto profilu patří. Je tedy jasné, že znalost zákazníkových zájmů a 
přání představuje velkou konkurenční výhodu, jelikož se získáním zákazníkovy pozornosti 
je spojena větší pravděpodobnost tvorby zisku. 
Zákazník může pozorovat výhody tohoto procesu např. v tom, že nepotřebuje tolik času na 
vyhledání obsahu, který ho zajímá, nebo v získání slevy na produkt, který často kupuje. Čeho 
si již všimnout nemusí, jsou nevýhody s tímto procesem spojené, jako je užívání dat k úplně 
jiným než zákazníkem předpokládaným účelům, jejich sdílení se subjekty, které zákazník 
původně neočekával apod. Může se dokonce i stát, že informace o tom, že momentálně 
nějaký produkt nutně potřebuje, bude zneužita k nabídnutí vyšší ceny za tento produkt než 
obyčejně. Odpovědi na otázky, jaká data jsou o zákaznících sbírána, jak jsou dále 
zpracovávána, kde jsou ukládána a jak jsou chráněna, jsou pro subjekty údajů často 
nezjistitelné. 
Údaje jsou sbírány pomocí různých technických prostředků, jako jsou IP adresy, cookies, 
web bugs či fingerprinting. Díky těmto prostředkům je možné identifikovat uživatele, aniž 
by si toho on sám musel být vědom. Často je přenos dat od uživatele směrem 
k poskytovatelům online služeb nutný k umožnění technického přenosu vyžádaných dat 
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zpět k uživateli (např. „sdělení“ IP adresy uživatele, aby na ni mohl být zaslán obsah webové 
stránky, kterou si uživatel přeje zobrazit). Identifikace je dále možná i pomocí vědomého 
poskytnutí údajů při registraci apod. 
Zpracovávání údajů za účelem vytvoření profilů a jejich aplikace může zasahovat do 
soukromí uživatelů. Ti poskytují své údaje za určitých okolností či s určitým záměrem. 
Pokud jsou údaje použity v úplně jiném kontextu, než ve kterém byly poskytnuty, jedná se 
podle teorie kontextuální integrity popsané Helen Nissenbaum83 o zásah do soukromí. 
Debaty o tom, co je to soukromí, začaly již v roce 1890 článkem Warrena a Brandeise Právo 
na soukromí. Ti tehdy reagovali na pokrok v oblasti fotografie a vznik bulvárního tisku a 
definovali právo na soukromí jako „the right to be let alone“.84 Westin popsal soukromí jako 
„nárok jednotlivců, skupin či institucí, aby určovali, jak a do jaké míry budou informace o 
nich šířeny mezi ostatními“.85 Reagoval tím na nové snadné možnosti odposlouchávání 
telefonní komunikace. V posledních zhruba dvaceti letech s rozšířením nových technických 
prostředků definuje Agre soukromí jako „svobodu od neodůvodněných omezení při 
budování vlastní identity“86 a podobně Cohen tvrdí, že soukromí je „spíše o zabránění 
nepřerušeného utvrzování vzorů předurčených jinými“.87 Zdá se, že všechny pokusy o 
definování soukromí vždy reagují na nějaký aktuální vývoj (technologický, společenský), 
který přináší nové výzvy pro zajištění ochrany soukromí. 
Rizika profilování lze spatřovat v mnoha ohledech. Jedním z nich je, že správnost aplikace 
profilů závisí na správnosti vstupních dat. Nejsou-li tato data správná, může to vést např. i 
ke zhoršení účinků diskriminace, což je jedno z dalších rizik profilování. Rozdělování 
jednotlivců do skupin a odlišné zacházení s nimi podle toho, do které skupiny patří, je 
základní esencí profilování. Nicméně některé rozlišování může být nežádoucí či dokonce 
nezákonné, a sice v případě, pokud je založené na pohlaví, rase, etnicitě, sociálním původu 
apod. Takováto kritéria mohou však být v profilech obsažena i jen nepřímo, proto je velmi 
těžké zjistit, zda k profilování na základě těchto kritérií dochází. Diskriminace může být i 
cenová, a to v případě, že prodávající upraví cenu zboží nebo služby na míru přesně tak, aby 
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se rovnala tomu, kolik je zákazník ve své momentální situaci ochoten maximálně zaplatit. 
Toto chování hraničí s manipulací, kdy zákazník může být i motivován kupovat si zboží, 
které by jinak za obvyklou, pro všechny stejnou, cenu nechtěl. Dalším problémem 
profilování je jistá stereotypizace a určování chování vůči uživatelům na základě určitých 
zobecnění, která jsou pro jednotlivce platná jen s určitou pravděpodobností, a na základě 
údajů, které se mohou měnit s tím, jak se mohou měnit zájmy a preference lidské bytosti. 
Panuje shoda na tom, že soukromí je velmi důležitým předpokladem svobodného rozvoje 
identity jednotlivce. Podle Vellemana mají osoby „zásadní zájem na tom, aby byli uznáváni 
jako sebeprezentující bytosti“,88 čili bytosti, které samy rozhodují, jakému okruhu lidí o sobě 
sdělí jaké informace. I německý ústavní soud uznal tuto podmínku jako zásadní pro právo 
na vlastní rozvoj.89 Ústavně je tedy toto právo zaručeno vůči státu, jak je to však vůči 
privátním subjektům? Vůči nim takovéto právo zakotveno není, přestože již nyní mají větší 
moc než státy, a tudíž představují větší hrozbu. S tímto souvisí i již zmiňované možnosti 
manipulace. Teoreticky bychom mohli být svědky i toho, že lidem bude nabízen jen obsah, 
který je výhodný pro jeho poskytovatele. Zatím jsme zvyklí na to, že obsah je přizpůsobován 
podle preferencí uživatele tak, aby se rád na stránky poskytovatele služeb vracel. 
Konfrontování lidí jen s obsahem, se kterým souhlasí nebo který se jim líbí, přináší také svá 
úskalí. V případě informací o dění ve světě by mohl mít za následek, že lidé nebudou mít 
navzájem ponětí o názorech jiných skupin, než do kterých patří, což je obecně nebezpečné 
pro demokracii. 
Na druhou stranu, Posner upozorňuje na to, že je legitimní, aby smluvní strany zjišťovaly o 
sobě navzájem co nejvíc s cílem vyhnout se tomu, že budou druhou stranou podvedeny či 
zneužity. S tím lze jistě souhlasit, nicméně zákazníci či uživatelé jsou při zjišťování 
takovýchto informací v mnohem slabší pozici. Jejich jedinou obranou proti takovémuto 
chování ze strany poskytovatele zboží či služeb je často vůbec jejich nabídku nevyužívat, což 
opět ústí v omezování využívání svého právo na vlastní rozvoj. Problémy v oblasti práva na 
vlastní rozvoj a informační asymetrie jsou ze všech problémů, které profilování přináší, dle 
mého názoru ty nejvýznamnější. 
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Informační asymetrie patří mezi způsoby selhání trhu. Při profilování se projevuje tak, že 
uživatelé často nemají ponětí, co o nich poskytovatelé služeb vědí, na základě jakých údajů 
a proč je s nimi zacházeno tak, jak je. Nevědí ani, jakou hodnotu jejich data pro podnikatele 
mají, tudíž neexistuje žádný „trh s informacemi o vlastní osobě“. Jakožto selhání trhu by 
však tento problém měl být napraven. Návrhy řešení však budou popsány až po stručném 
popisu současné právní úpravy. 
Nyní účinnou úpravu představuje směrnice 95/46/ES o ochraně fyzických osob 
v souvislosti se zpracováním osobních údajů a o volném pohybu těchto údajů (DPD) a 
směrnice 2002/58/ES o zpracování osobních údajů a ochraně soukromí v odvětví 
elektronických komunikací (ePrivacy směrnice), která je významná kvůli svému ustanovení 
čl. 5 odst. 3 týkající se cookies. 
Hlavní principy úpravy jsou následující: (i) osobní údaje musí být zpracovávány za použití 
legálních a čestných prostředků, (ii) musí být shromažďovány pro specificky vymezené a 
legitimní účely a zpracovávány v souladu s těmito účely, (iii) shromážděné osobní údaje 
musí být relevantní a přiměřeně odpovídat účelům, pro který byly shromážděny nebo pro 
který jsou zpracovávány, (iv) osobní údaje musí být přesné, úplné a průběžně 
aktualizované, (v) mohou být shromažďovány pouze se souhlasem subjektu údajů nebo 
v jiných případech, kdy je to „nezbytné“, (vi) správce údajů musí informovat subjekt údajů 
o účelech zpracování nejpozději v době shromažďování údajů a také o příjemcích nebo 
kategoriích příjemců údajů, (vii) subjekt údajů má právo obdržet potvrzení o tom, že jeho 
údaje jsou zpracovávány a má právo na opravu, výmaz nebo blokování údajů a je oprávněn 
získat oznámení o postupu automatického zpracování údajů, které se ho týkají, alespoň 
v případě automaticky přijímaných rozhodnutí. 
Vzhledem k rozdílné implementaci DPD v různých státech a technologickému rozvoji 
zejména v oblasti online činností byl v lednu 2012 představen návrh nového obecného 
nařízení o ochraně osobních údajů (GDPR). Finální verze tohoto nařízení byla přijata 
Evropským parlamentem v dubnu 2016. V účinnost nařízení vstoupí v roce 2018. 
Důležitým pojmem pro aplikaci těchto předpisů je pojem „osobní údaj“. Podle článku 2 písm. 
a) DPD i článku 4 bodu 1) GDPR je osobním údajem „každá informace o identifikované nebo 
identifikovatelné osobě (subjekt údajů); identifikovatelnou osobou se rozumí osoba, kterou 
lze přímo či nepřímo identifikovat, zejména s odkazem na identifikační číslo nebo na jeden 
či více zvláštních prvků její fyzické, fyziologické, psychické, ekonomické, kulturní nebo 
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sociální identity“. GDPR přidává další identifikátory: lokační údaje, síťový identifikátor či 
prvky genetické identity. 
Předpisy na ochranu osobních údajů se však neaplikují na anonymní údaje, tj. údaje, které 
jsou anonymizovány do té míry, že subjekt údajů již není identifikovatelný. Jednoznačně 
určit, kdy již nelze subjekt údajů identifikovat, však nemusí být jednoduché. Mohou nastat 
následující situace: a) údaje, podle kterých osobu identifikovat nelze, se propojí s údaji, 
které již tuto možnost dávají, b) údaje lze spojit s konkrétní osobou vzhledem k jejich 
jedinečnosti, c) údaje lze spojit s konkrétní osobou za pomoci jedinečných identifikátorů 
(jiných než jméno a adresa, např. koncové zařízení). 
Identifikovatelnost osoby závisí na tom, kým má být identifikovatelná, zda jen správcem 
údajů nebo jakoukoliv třetí osobou. Dále záleží na tom, jak náročné (na čas a peníze) by 
identifikování osoby bylo. Důležitý je také kontext – pro poskytovatele služeb není 
významné, jak se osoba, na kterou cílí, skutečně jmenuje apod. – hlavní je rozpoznat ji a 
zacílit na ni správný obsah. Proto lze dojít k závěru, že na většinu, pokud ne na všechny 
činnosti související s profilováním, se vztahují předpisy upravující ochranu osobních údajů. 
Anonymizování údajů je jedním ze způsobů zpracování údajů. Proto je k němu zapotřebí 
souhlasu subjektu údajů (nebo jiné okolnosti, která k takovémuto zpracování správce 
opravňuje). Další zpracovávání takto anonymizovaných údajů již předpisům na ochranu 
osobních údajů nepodléhá. 
Všechny osoby mají právo „nestat se subjektem rozhodnutí, které vůči nim zakládá právní 
účinky nebo které se jich významně dotýká, přijatého výlučně na základě automatizovaného 
zpracování údajů“. Tato formulace obsahuje prostor pro výklad toho, co je to rozhodnutí, a 
která z nich zakládají právní účinky nebo se osob významně dotýkají. Je např. rozhodnutím 
i zobrazování personalizované reklamy na webových stránkách, které si uživatel zrovna 
prohlíží?90 (Odpoveď zní pravděpodobně ne, a to vzhledem k požadavku významného 
dotčení subjektu.) 
Ke zpracovávání údajů je buď zapotřebí souhlas, nebo musí být podle článku 7 písm. f) DPD, 
případně podle článku 6 odst. 1 písm. f) GDPR „nezbytné pro uskutečnění oprávněných 
zájmů správce nebo třetí osoby či osob, kterým jsou údaje sdělovány, za podmínky, že 
nepřevyšují zájem nebo základní práva a svobody subjektu údajů“. Tato podmínka bude 
                                                             
90 Bygrave, L. A.: ‘Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated 
Profiling’, Computer Law & Security Report, 2001, 17 (1), str. 17-24, na str. 19 
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moci být právním důvodem zpracování osobních údajů pro reklamní účely spíše zřídkakdy. 
Proto se nyní zaměříme na souhlas subjektu údajů. Udělení souhlasu znamená podle článku 
2 písm. h) DPD a podobně podle článku 4 bodu 11) GDPR „svobodný, výslovný a vědomý 
projev vůle, kterým subjekt údajů dává své svolení k tomu, aby osobní údaje, které se jej 
týkají, byly předmětem zpracování“. Jeho největší nevýhodou je to, že se v reálném světě 
prakticky nevyskytuje.91 Za prvé, nikdo nečte dlouhé popisy něčeho, čemu nerozumí. Za 
druhé, i kdyby je četl, musel by tak učinit i několikrát denně, což by zabíralo příliš mnoho 
času. A za třetí, i kdyby je přesto četl, neznamená to ještě, že z nich bude schopen pochopit 
veškeré následky. Dát skutečně informovaný souhlas je téměř nemožné. 
Mezi nejdůležitější novinky obecného nařízení o ochraně osobních údajů patří rozšíření 
místní působnosti oproti DPD. Nařízení se bude aplikovat i v případě, že zpracovávání údajů 
probíhá mimo Unii, pokud jsou zpracovávány osobní údaje subjektů nacházejících se v Unii 
a pokud zpracovávání souvisím s monitorováním chování, k němuž dochází na území Unie. 
Další novinkou je definice profilování. Tím se rozumí dle článku 4 bodu 4 GDPR „jakákoli 
forma automatizovaného zpracování osobních údajů spočívající v jejich použití k hodnocení 
některých osobních aspektů vztahujících se k fyzické osobě, zejména k rozboru nebo 
odhadu aspektů týkajících se jejího pracovního výkonu, ekonomické situace, zdravotního 
stavu, osobních preferencí, zájmů, spolehlivosti, chování, místa, kde se nachází, nebo 
pohybu“. Jedná se především o činnost směřující k přijímání rozhodnutí nebo k analýze či 
odhadu preferencí, postojů a chování osoby (recitál 24). 
Ochrana osobních údajů je tedy založena na ochraně ex ante. Je založena na předpokladu, 
že osobní údaje lze snadno před ostatními skrýt, což již ale neplatí. Také již tolik nezáleží na 
vstupu, nýbrž na výsledcích analýzy dat a určení následného chování vůči subjektu, čili na 
výstupu zpracování osobních údajů. Proto by se spíš právní úprava měla soustředit na 
stadium užívání dat, nikoliv na stadium jejich shromažďování.92 
Vedle soukromí však existují i jiné hodnoty, se kterými je třeba právo na soukromí 
poměřovat, neboť jsou důležité zase z jiných hledisek. Např. zájem na inovacích a 
zefektivňování a právo na podnikání. Nicméně je vidět, že především zájem na tom, aby se 
jednotlivec nemusel rozhodovat pouze mezi poskytnutím obrovského množství údajů o 
                                                             
91 Svantesson, D.: ‘The (Uncertain) Future of Online Data Privacy’, Masaryk University Journal of Law 
and Technology, 2015, 9 (1), str. 129-286, na str. 148-149 
92 Zarsky, T.: ‘Responding to the Inevitable Outcomes of Profiling’, in: Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds.): Data 
Protection in a Profiled World, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, str. 57 
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sobě a mezi celkovým odmítnutím služby, kterou by jinak chtěl nebo kterou je dokonce 
„nucen“ využívat, není dostatečně obhajován. 
K jeho prosazování není však právní regulace jediným prostředkem. Lessig popisuje ve své 
knize čtyři způsoby regulace: právo, normy (např. etické či dobrovolné samoregulační), trh 
(řízený pravidly poptávky a nabídky a neviditelnou rukou trhu) a architektura (ve smyslu 
jaké chování umožňují technologie).93 
Pokud jde o právní regulaci, mohla by pomoci v případě řešení problému s informovaným 
souhlasem. Některé instituce by mohly hodnotit zásady ochrany soukromí určené 
uživatelům a udělovat certifikáty zaručující soulad těchto zásad s předpisy na ochranu 
osobních údajů. Trh by poté zajistil, že by uživatelé dávali přednost poskytovatelům služeb 
s těmito certifikáty, a ti by byli více motivováni si je opatřit. Svantesson pak navrhuje, aby 
některá ujednání ohledně zásad ochrany soukromí byla v zájmu ochrany subjektů údajů 
(jakožto slabší strany) zakázána.94 
Jedním z dalších opatření je posílení transparentnosti za účelem odstranění informační 
asymetrie. Jedná se jak o zavedení smysluplného informování o postupu při automatickém 
rozhodování, které je zakotveno v článku 14 odst. 2 písm. g) GDPR, tak o možnost zavedení 
notifikací, že zobrazovaný obsah byl personalizován. Takováto povinnost zatím nikde 
zakotvena není. Architektonické řešení by spočívalo v zavedení systémů „transparency by 
design“, které by společnosti umožňovaly kontrolovat, zda údaje nashromážděné o 
subjektech jsou správné a zda postupy automatického rozhodování jsou logicky 
odůvodněné a založené na dovolených způsobech zpracování údajů. 
Lepší možnost kontroly jednotlivců nad vlastními údaji by mohla přinést tzv. Platform for 
Privacy Preferences (P3P). Ta by umožňovala uživatelům nastavit požadavky ohledně 
ochrany soukromí, které musí webová stránka, kterou chce navštívit nebo služba, kterou 
chce využít, splňovat. Pokud by je nesplňovala, byl by uživatel notifikován a mohl by se 
rozhodnout o dalším postupu. Odpadlo by tak čtení dlouhých dokumentů, čímž by se posílila 
i informovanost případného souhlasu se zásadami ochrany soukromí. Nevyřešila by se tím 
ale slabá vyjednávací síla jednotlivce tak, aby nemusel vždy pouze jen přistupovat na 
požadavky poskytovatele služeb. 
                                                             
93 Lessig, L.: Code version 2.0, New York, Basic Books, 2006, str. 138 
94 Svantesson, D.: ‘The (Uncertain) Future of Online Data Privacy’, Masaryk University Journal of Law 
and Technology, 2015, 9 (1), str. 129-286, na str. 149 
58 
 
Architektura vystavěna na základě „Privacy by Design“ představuje systém užívající 
různých jednotlivých „Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) tak, aby odpovídal 
principům ochrany osobních údajů a který umožňuje, aby si uživatelé nastavili svou úroveň 
ochrany. Podoba takovéhoto systému závisí na technickém vývoji a nákladech realizace již 
vynalezených technických řešení. Požadavek na takovouto architekturu je v GDPR již 
zakotven, nicméně s ohledem na předchozí větu bude jeho dopad na úroveň ochrany 
osobních údajů spíše nevýznamný. 
Jako nejnadějnější způsob řešení se mi jeví rozšíření tzv. Personal Data Stores (PDSs). Tento 
nástroj by umožnil uživatelům ukládat veškerá data o své osobě na svém vlastním serveru 
nebo cloudu, čili ve vlastním úložišti dat. Aplikace třetích stran chtějící využít tato data by 
jen poslaly na toto úložiště svůj požadavek s algoritmem, který by na tomto úložišti provedl 
výpočet a poslal zpět jen výsledek výpočtu. Subjekt údajů by měl tedy pod kontrolou jak svá 
data, tak jejich zpracování. Pravděpodobnost zachování anonymity při takovémto procesu 
by byla mnohem vyšší než za současné situace, kdy data jsou shromažďována na serverech 
poskytovatelů služeb a výpočet probíhá tamtéž. Data už jednou nashromážděná by navíc 
takto byla dostupná všem, což by snížilo bariéry vstupu na trh nových poskytovatelů služeb. 
Zavedení tohoto řešení by obnášelo buď přemluvení nějakého velkého poskytovatele, aby 
zavedení tohoto řešení podpořil, nebo přijetí úplně nové právní úpravy. Ještě předtím by ale 
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The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate what online profiling is, what happens with users’ 
or customers’ personal data during this process, how these activities interfere with the 
individuals’ right to privacy, what the legal regulation in this field is, whether the privacy 
interests of individuals are sufficiently protected and if not, how the situation might be 
improved. 
The thesis starts with description of todays’ business practices that are based on collecting 
data about customers, analyzing it and creating profiles suggesting the most profitable 
behaviour of businesses towards customers. It is followed by explanation of the 
technological tools enabling data collection and the method of data mining that is the key 
enabler of creating profiles. 
The text continues with description of risks of profiling in relation to privacy, i.e. the issues 
of discrimination, de-individualisation, restriction of individual autonomy, information 
asymmetries and possible misuse of profiles. The notion of right to privacy is explained and 
other interests that have to be balanced with privacy are mentioned as well. 
After that follows a critical description of the current legal framework in the European 
Union. It consists of Data Protection Directive, ePrivacy Directive and since 2018 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation replacing the Data Protection Directive. The drawbacks 
of the legal regulation resulting in insufficient privacy protection are pointed out and then 
their possible solutions are introduced. 
The proposed solutions are mostly based on the following forms of regulation: law, market 
and architecture. The advantages and disadvantages of each solution are described. As the 
most promising solution is suggested using so called “Personal Data Stores” that enable 







Cílem této diplomové práce je ozřejmit co je online profilování, jak je při něm nakládáno 
s osobními údaji zákazníků či uživatelů, jak tyto činnosti kolidují s právem na ochranu 
soukromí jednotlivců, jaká je právní úprava této oblasti, zda zájem na ochraně soukromí je 
dostatečně chráněn a pokud ne, jak by se tato situace dala napravit. 
Práce začíná popisem dnešních obchodních praktik založených na shromažďování údajů o 
zákaznících či uživatelích, jejich analyzování a tvorbě profilů obsahujících návrhy na 
chování poskytovatelů služeb vůči svým zákazníkům tak, aby poskytovatelům přinášelo co 
největší zisk. Následuje technický popis nástrojů umožňujících shromažďování údajů a 
metody data miningu, která je klíčová pro vytváření profilů. 
Text pokračuje popisem toho, jaká rizika pro ochranu soukromí profilování představuje, tj. 
riziko diskriminace, deindividualizace, omezování práva na osobní rozvoj, informační 
asymetrie a možné zneužívání profilů. Při této příležitosti je vysvětlen i pojem práva na 
soukromí a jsou zmíněny ostatní zájmy, které by měly být se zájmem na ochraně soukromí 
vyvažovány. 
Následuje kritický popis současné právní regulace v Evropské Unii. Ta je tvořena směrnicí 
o ochraně osobních údajů, ePrivacy směrnicí a od roku 2018 obecným nařízením o ochraně 
osobních údajů, které nahradí dosavadní směrnici o ochraně osobních údajů. Je poukázáno 
na nevýhody těchto právních úprav vedoucích k nedostatečné ochraně soukromí a poté jsou 
navržena řešení zmíněných nevýhod. 
Tato řešení užívají většinou následující formy regulace: právo, trh a (systémovou) 
architekturu. U každého z řešení jsou popsány jeho výhody a nevýhody. Jako nejslibnější 
řešení je navrhováno rozšíření užívání tzv. „Personal Data Stores“, které by umožnily 
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